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INTRODUCTION 
The growth of employer policies and procedures governing equal employment op-
portunity (“EEO”) in the workplace, replete with an expanding cohort of employees over-
seeing them, has set the stage for a crisis in retaliation law. One of the more significant yet 
under-explored developments in the law of employment discrimination is the no-man’s 
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land in which employees who handle EEO matters find themselves when they experience 
retaliation. In recent years, importing doctrines from other areas of employment law, 
courts have denied employees protection from retaliation for handling internal complaints 
challenging discrimination under employer policies. Employees charged with responsibil-
ity for EEO compliance increasingly find themselves unprotected from retaliation for act-
ing, within their prescribed roles, in opposition to discrimination instead of towing the 
company line. This development not only undermines the effectiveness of retaliation law 
by creating a virtual exemption for a class of employees based on their job description, but 
it also threatens the integrity of discrimination law more broadly. 
This article explains why the current framework for addressing retaliation against 
EEO personnel is untenable. It also exposes the complicated questions that arise in think-
ing about how retaliation law should be reconfigured to protect these employees. The core 
dilemma is that handling internal discrimination complaints and overseeing EEO compli-
ance—essentially, actions “opposing” discrimination—are part of the employee’s job du-
ties. And yet, reviewing employee job performance is well within the realm of discretion-
ary conduct by employers left unchecked by the limited intrusion of discrimination statutes 
into the pre-existing employment-at-will regime. When an employee’s job duties include 
EEO compliance, a negative evaluation of how the employee performs that responsibility 
is both, simultaneously, legitimate oversight of job performance and adverse action for 
opposing discrimination. As employers continue to internalize Title VII compliance re-
sponsibilities and assign them to their own employees, retaliation law is called upon to 
distinguish between employers’ permissible oversight of job performance and unlawful 
retaliation for opposition to discrimination. So far, retaliation law has done a miserable 
job. The underlying difficulty is that when an employee’s job responsibilities encompass 
EEO compliance, job performance and protected activity are one and the same. 
By exploring this emergent gap in retaliation law, this article calls attention to the 
vulnerability of employees who, in the course of performing EEO responsibilities, are pun-
ished for their actions taken in opposition to discrimination. Part I sketches the develop-
ments in the law that have contributed to the prominence of the EEO office in the modern 
workplace and lays the groundwork for critiquing retaliation law’s failure to keep pace 
with these developments. It begins by describing the shift to internal governance of the 
workplace—that is, the proliferation of internal policies and procedures for addressing 
discrimination and the legal incentives for having such policies. It then describes the role-
conflicts experienced by the employees charged with implementing these policies. Finally, 
it provides a summary of how retaliation law distinguishes internal and external com-
plaints, with different levels of legal protections depending on the path of the complaint. 
Since employer EEO processes involve internal complaints, they are governed by Title 
VII’s opposition clause, which offers a lower level of protection from retaliation than the 
participation clause, which governs complaints made to external enforcement agencies. 
Part II describes the developments in retaliation law that result in denying even the 
lower tier protection of the opposition clause to the employees who perform EEO respon-
sibilities. First, these employees face a distinctive problem under the generally applicable 
reasonable belief doctrine, since retaliation that occurs early in the complaint process can 
halt an investigation before any foundation for forming a reasonable belief exists. Second, 
for the EEO employee who can clear the reasonable belief requirement, an even more 
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substantial obstacle awaits. A newly-developing doctrine, labeled by some courts as the 
“manager rule,” denies protection from retaliation to employees whose job duties involve 
overseeing internal discrimination complaints. The remainder of this section traces the 
evolution of this doctrine and its expanding roots in discrimination law. 
Part III explores the incoherence of the retaliation doctrines that are ensnaring EEO 
employees. It first delves deeper into the cases in which EEO employees have prevailed, 
in search of a limiting principle that ultimately proves elusive. It then discusses the dilem-
mas the doctrine poses for EEO employees seeking to retain protection from retaliation. 
Courts’ insistence that these employees step outside their EEO roles in order to secure 
protection risks subjecting them to punishment for insubordination and disloyalty. The 
principles articulated in these cases provide no safe way out of the dilemma. The section 
concludes by explaining this doctrinal incoherence as a product of the clash between dis-
crimination law’s incorporation of internal policies and procedures, which necessitates the 
employment of persons whose job responsibilities include overseeing EEO compliance, 
and the retention of an employment-at-will regime that ensures employer discretion in 
supervising job performance. In this complicated stew, it is impossible to separate a retal-
iatory motive from the employer’s legitimate oversight of job performance. The em-
ployee’s job duties are inseparable from opposition to discrimination. 
Part IV evaluates these developments in retaliation law against the backdrop of dis-
crimination law’s acceleration of internal grievance procedures and anti-discrimination 
policies. Over the past two decades, legal standards have incorporated internal policies and 
procedures for handling discrimination into substantive determinations about compliance 
with the law. And yet, the lack of safeguards for the employees implementing these inter-
nal policies and governance procedures should call into question the integrity of such pol-
icies and procedures. Without strong protection from retaliation, employers gain the ben-
efit of having EEO internal policies and procedures without any assurance that they 
actually serve the preventive and remedial functions the law attributes to them. The result 
is a sharp incongruity between retaliation law and the legal framework that has developed 
to address discrimination claims. This section concludes by arguing that, given the unlike-
lihood of reversing the law’s embrace of internal governance, the doctrines that have de-
veloped to withhold retaliation protection from EEO employees should be replaced with a 
more transparent balancing of the employer’s and employee’s interests in such cases. A 
forthright evaluation of the reasonableness of the employee’s actions opposing discrimi-
nation, as judged from the perspective of a reasonable EEO professional following the 
employer’s antidiscrimination policy, would offer a better measure of protection for EEO 
employees than existing law, while still permitting employers to punish poor job perfor-
mance that exceeds the boundaries of reasonableness. While far from perfect, such a bal-
ancing test would be preferable to the current virtual exclusion of EEO employees from 
retaliation law’s protections. 
I. MAPPING THE EEO OFFICE AND ITS PLACE IN RETALIATION LAW 
One of the most important developments in workplace law in the past two decades 
is the proliferation of internal employer policies and procedures for managing conflicts in 
3
Brake: Retaliation in the EEO Office
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
4 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1 
the workplace.1 In particular, questions, concerns, and disputes about perceived discrimi-
nation are now governed by comprehensive employer policies on the subject, with detailed 
processes for channeling complaints. Discrimination law, under the guise of encouraging 
voluntary compliance and preventing discrimination, has warmly embraced and encour-
aged this trend. Retaliation law, however, marks a sharp divide in the protections afforded 
complaints about discrimination depending on whether they are pursued through an offi-
cial statutory enforcement mechanism—the EEOC, a state fair employment agency, or a 
court—or voiced internally to the employer. While the former set of complaints trigger the 
full scope of the law’s protection, the latter group triggers a different set of rules. The 
bifurcation of retaliation law into separate tiers of protection for internal and external com-
plaints laid the groundwork for the development of the distinctive doctrinal rules govern-
ing EEO employees. 
A. The Normalization of Employer Nondiscrimination Policies 
The judicial embrace of legal incentives encouraging employers to promulgate pol-
icies and procedures for handling discrimination complaints began in earnest in the late 
1990s. A pair of cases decided in 1998 made employer liability for supervisory sexual 
harassment turn largely on the existence and use of internal harassment policies and griev-
ance procedures. In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth2 and Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton,3 the Supreme Court adopted an affirmative defense to employer liability for a su-
pervisor’s sexual harassment, not involving a tangible employment action, where the em-
ployer shows: 1) that it acted reasonably to prevent and correct harassment; and 2) that the 
plaintiff acted unreasonably in failing to prevent or mitigate harm. While the Court did not 
spell out the precise contours of these two prongs, it clearly made anti-harassment policies 
and complaint processes a cornerstone of the defense. As applied by lower courts, the 
existence of internal policies and complaint procedures for addressing sexual harassment, 
coupled with the plaintiff’s failure to use them in a reasonably prompt fashion, is generally 
sufficient to establish the affirmative defense.4 
In the wake of Ellerth and Faragher, employer anti-harassment policies and proce-
dures have become enshrined in the legal framework for determining employer liability 
for harassment. Although adopted in cases involving sexual harassment, the same liability 
framework applies to other forms of harassment covered by Title VII—harassment based 
on race, color, religion, or national origin, so that these broader harassment policies are 
incorporated into the substantive legal standards for these kinds of harassment as well.5 
Since these cases were decided, writing anti-harassment policies, consulting on and de-
signing complaint channels, and conducting trainings for employees on these policies have 
                                                          
 1. See generally Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005). 
 2. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 3. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 4. See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Con-
fronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 5–6 (2001) [hereinafter Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention]. 
 5. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 129, 132 (2014) [hereinafter Brake, 
Retaliation in an EEO World]. 
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become a cottage industry.6 It is the rare employer today that lacks a policy prohibiting 
unlawful harassment and a process for complaining about it.7 
Harassment law is not the only area of Title VII law that incorporates an employer’s 
internal policies and grievance procedures into the legal framework of employer liability 
for discrimination. Employer liability for constructive discharge, in cases where the dis-
criminatory action precipitating the “quit” falls short of a tangible employment action, also 
turns on the same affirmative defense.8 In such cases, the employee’s unreasonable failure 
to report the precipitating discriminatory acts through the employer’s nondiscrimination 
policy will exonerate the employer of liability for constructive discharge. Regardless of 
the type of discrimination alleged, the existence of an employer antidiscrimination policy 
is also relevant to the plaintiff’s ability to seek punitive damages for proven discrimination. 
One year after the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, in Kolstad v. American Dental Associ-
ation,9 the Supreme Court limited the availability of punitive damages under Title VII to 
cases where the plaintiff shows that the employer acted in bad faith or with a reckless 
disregard toward employee rights. Employers may avoid such a finding, the Court in-
structed, if they “adopt anti-discrimination policies and . . . educate their personnel on Title 
VII’s prohibitions.”10 By tying immunity from punitive damages to employer policies, the 
ruling encourages employers to have broad anti-discrimination policies and procedures. 
A recent Supreme Court decision suggests that employer nondiscrimination policies 
may eventually become even more tied into the doctrinal rules regulating employer liabil-
ity. In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, Inc.,11 the Court pointedly left open the possibility that 
the existence of an internal anti-discrimination policy and complaint procedure, combined 
with the plaintiff’s failure to use it, could potentially break the chain of causation in cases 
where a biased subordinate influences a manager to take discriminatory action against the 
plaintiff. In Staub, the Court resolved the so-called “cat’s paw” issue that had perplexed 
the lower courts by ruling that the employer is liable when a supervisory employee acts 
with discriminatory intent to cause a higher-up employee to take adverse action against 
the plaintiff.12 While upholding employer liability in such cases, the Court raised the pos-
sibility that the existence of an employer policy and process for challenging discrimina-
tion, coupled with the employee’s failure to take advantage of it, might break the chain of 
causation and exonerate the employer from liability.13 If that contingency, which the Court 
raised in dicta, were to materialize into a new rule limiting employer liability, the presence 
of internal discrimination policies and complaint channels would play an even bigger role 
                                                          
 6. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of Employee Sex-
ual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147, 147–55 (2001). 
 7. FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 93–97, 201, 213 (2009). 
 8. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
 9. Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). 
 10. Id. at 545. 
 11. Staub v. Proctor Hospital, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). Although Staub involved a claim brought under 
the Uniformed Service Employees Rights and Responsibilities Act (USERRA), it is widely understood to govern 
Title VII actions as well. See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431, 
1433–36 (2012). 
 12. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192. The “cat’s paw” label derives from an Aesop’s fairy tale about a cat who 
manipulated a monkey to do its bidding, making the monkey the “cat’s paw;” once used to describe this class of 
cases, the metaphor has stuck. Id. at 1190 n.1. 
 13. Id. at 1194 n.4 (“We also observe that Staub took advantage of Proctor’s grievance process, and we ex-
press no view as to whether Proctor would have an affirmative defense if he did not.”). 
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in establishing employer compliance in an even wider class of cases. 
The prevalence of employer anti-discrimination policies and the legal rules incen-
tivizing them are now so entangled that it is hard to tell which came first. Some law and 
society scholars have made a persuasive case that the law’s embrace of employer policies 
was, in fact, endogenous; that is, the widespread adoption of anti-discrimination policies 
by employers predated and precipitated courts’ integration of them into the substantive 
law of discrimination.14 By this account, personnel professionals and EEO specialists suc-
ceeded in filling a regulatory void with policies, complaint procedures and training pro-
grams that came to define judicial understandings of employer compliance with the exter-
nal law.15 In support of this narrative, Frank Dobbin makes the point that the vast majority 
of employers already had sexual harassment policies and complaint procedures in place 
before the Court decided the Faragher and Ellerth cases.16 When the Court accepted the 
significance of employer anti-harassment policies as evidence of compliance with the law, 
it reflected, rather than initiated, the trend towards employer adoption of internal policies 
and procedures for addressing discrimination.17 
In addition to the doctrinal rules that formally incentivize employer policies, em-
ployer anti-discrimination policies, and complaint procedures are also incorporated into 
the substantive law through less formal mechanisms. Because the legal standard for dis-
parate treatment, the most common employment discrimination claim, requires proof of 
discriminatory intent, employer anti-discrimination policies play an important role in evi-
dencing substantive compliance with the law.18 Such policies are viewed as symbolic man-
ifestations of good faith efforts to prevent discrimination, so much so that judges often 
equate the existence of employer anti-discrimination policies and complaint procedures 
with substantive legal compliance itself.19 The EEOC, which encourages employers to 
adopt nondiscrimination policies and grievance procedures, also looks favorably on such 
measures.20 Research investigating the resolution of charges filed with the EEOC has 
found that the EEOC is significantly less likely to find “cause” for discrimination when 
the employer has an anti-discrimination policy and grievance procedure.21 This presump-
                                                          
 14. See DOBBIN, supra note 7. 
 15. Id. at 1–21. 
 16. Id. at 191, 213. See also Elizabeth Chambliss, Title VII as a Displacement of Conflict, 6 TEMPLE POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1997) (discussing the shift by employers to adopt internal policies and procedures 
addressing discrimination that was in full swing by the mid-1990s). 
 17. DOBBIN, supra note 7, at 4, 191. 
 18. See Lauren B. Edelman, Linda H. Krieger, Scott R. Eliason, Catherine R. Albiston & Virginia Mellema, 
When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 
929–30 (2011). 
 19. See Lauren B. Edelman, Law at Work: The Endogenous Construction of Civil Rights, in HANDBOOK OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH 337 (Laura Beth Nielson & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005); Lauren B. 
Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Proce-
dures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 407 (1999) [hereinafter Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal 
Regulation]. 
 20. EEOC Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, 8 FAIR EMPL. 
PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) No. 966, at 405, 7651, 7661 (July 1999); EEOC Compliance Manual, No. 915.003, 
Section 15; Race & Color Discrimination 1104-21 (Apr. 19, 2006), available at www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-
color.html.   
 21. C. Elizabeth Hirsh & Sabino Kornrich, The Context of Discrimination: Workplace Conditions, Institu-
tional Environments, and Sex and Race Discrimination Charges, 113 AM. J. SOC. 1394, 1424–25 (2008). 
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss1/1
2014] RETALIATION IN THE EEO OFFICE 7 
tion of compliance redounds to the benefit of employers in all kinds of cases alleging in-
tentional discrimination, not just harassment cases.22 
The Supreme Court viewed an employer anti-discrimination policy in a similar light 
in its landmark decision overturning class certification in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.23 
The Court cited Wal-Mart’s establishment of a company-wide policy prohibiting discrim-
ination to help defeat the inference, urged by the plaintiffs, of a common policy of dis-
crimination through the exercise of delegated discretion.24 The existence of the company 
anti-discrimination policy had more explanatory force to the Court in accounting for the 
decisions of individual supervisors than the social framework testimony offered by the 
plaintiffs to show the existence of an unwritten policy of biased decision-making. 
Whether because of the law, or as a precursor to it and a driving force behind the 
development of the law, employer anti-discrimination policies and internal grievance pro-
cesses have become the norm in the modern workplace.25 Keeping this machinery running 
requires a legion of employees whose job responsibilities, in full or in part, consist of 
overseeing these policies and complaint processes.26 
B. The Dual Role of the EEO Employee 
The deluge of employer anti-discrimination policies and procedures requires a 
throng of employees to oversee and implement them. Job titles vary, as does the precise 
structuring of these jobs.27 Large employers may have one or more dedicated employees 
whose full-time responsibilities involve EEO compliance.28 Smaller employers may lump 
these responsibilities in with other human resources matters, placing them in the hands of 
a human resources department or personnel office.29 Other employers may allocate these 
responsibilities more diffusely, making many or even all supervisors responsible for EEO 
matters arising within their departments, instructing them to report discrimination com-
plaints through a chain of command, and handle them according to company policy. Typ-
                                                          
 22. See Lauren B. Edelman, Rivers of Law and Contested Terrain: A Law and Society Approach to Economic 
Rationality, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 181, 190 (2004); C. Elizabeth Hirsh, Settling for Less? Organizational De-
terminants of Discrimination-Charge Outcomes, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 239 (2008); see also Edelman et al., The 
Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 19, at 407 (“grievance procedures have emerged over the past few 
decades as the primary symbol of nondiscrimination and as the most rational way for employers to insulate 
themselves from legal liability”). 
 23. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 24. Id. at 2554 (“To the contrary, left to their own devices, most managers in any corporation—and surely 
most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based 
criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers, supra note 6, at 147–55; DOBBIN, supra 
note 7, at 213; Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 319, 334–36 (2005); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 
278–79 (2009) (noting citation of studies by Petitioner “demonstrating that Ellerth and Faragher have prompted 
many employers to adopt or strengthen procedures for investigating, preventing, and correcting discriminatory 
conduct”). 
 26. See DOBBIN, supra note 7, at 86–88, 93–97, 130–31. 
 27. See Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Don’t Kill the Messenger: Reprisal Discrimination in the Enforcement of 
Civil Rights Laws, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 367 n.1 (listing various titles, including: EEO officer, counselor, 
affirmative action officer, diversity manager, compliance officer, and EEO investigator; and noting that EEO 
duties are sometimes given to persons with other responsibilities and broader titles, such as general counsel). 
 28. See DOBBIN, supra note 7, at 86–88, 95–97, 130–31 (describing range of EEO personnel assignments). 
 29. Id. 
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ical EEO responsibilities include investigating and responding to discrimination com-
plaints brought by other employees.30 EEO personnel are also called upon to flag potential 
compliance problems, bringing them to the attention of the employer and making recom-
mendations to resolve them. In short, employees in these roles, whatever their title, con-
duct the work of “opposing discrimination.” 
However EEO responsibilities are packaged and parceled out, the employees per-
forming these functions face structural conflicts and challenges. They are tasked with du-
ties that create divided loyalties to management and to their fellow employees, and to the 
anti-discrimination directives of their employers’ policies and the law itself.31 In the course 
of performing these responsibilities, conflicts may arise over the substance of, and appro-
priate response to, employee discrimination complaints.32 In straddling these intersecting 
and potentially conflicting loyalties, the EEO employee may be viewed simultaneously as 
a “company man” by fellow employees and as a troublemaker by management. The con-
flicts inherent in EEO responsibilities leave these employees vulnerable to charges of dis-
loyalty from both of these constituencies. 
In the event of a conflict, the EEO employee has the most to lose from a rift with 
management. The nature of EEO responsibilities makes such conflicts endemic to the job. 
As Floyd Weatherspoon has explained, the employee “who raises an issue of discrimina-
tion and opposes such conduct may be viewed as being disloyal to the organization.”33 The 
robust performance of EEO functions can set the EEO employee on a collision course with 
the employer. The employer’s interest is best served by having anti-discrimination policies 
and procedures, but not necessarily by their vigorous implementation.34 For example, the 
EEO employee who questions or seeks to block a personnel action which she believes 
would jeopardize the employer’s compliance with Title VII may find herself in conflict 
with higher-up employees. Likewise, in counseling employees on their EEO rights, she 
walks a fine line in performing this function with integrity without being viewed as overly 
pro-employee and antagonistic to management.35 The potential for conflict is especially 
great if the person accused of bias is high in the power structure. In the event of such 
conflict, the mere existence of an anti-discrimination policy is no guarantee that the em-
ployer will support the actual work of the EEO employee seeking to implement that policy. 
The presence of EEO personnel in the workplace does not necessarily reflect manage-
ment’s agreement with the vigorous performance of these responsibilities. Displaying the 
EEO banner may be more of a reflection of the legal incentives described earlier, aug-
mented by a public relations boost, than a philosophical alignment with the mission of 
EEO work.36 
                                                          
 30. See Chambliss, supra note 16, at 10 n.44 (discussing the various responsibilities of EEO personnel). 
 31. See Jeffrey A. Mello, The Dual Loyalty Dilemma for HR Managers Under Title VII Compliance, 65 SAM 
ADVANCED MANAGEMENT J. 10, 11–12 (2000) (discussing the dual role and role conflicts facing the HR manager 
charged with Title VII compliance). 
 32.  See Weatherspoon, supra note 27, at 367. In addition, particular disagreements may arise over the scope 
of any duty of confidentiality, since employees may have an expectation of confidentiality when they confide 
EEO matters, while employers may demand to be informed about any and all complaints. Id. at 390. 
 33. Id. at 401–02. 
 34. Id. at 394. 
 35. Floyd Weatherspoon makes each of these points, discussing the precarious role of EEO employees and 
their vulnerabilities to reprisal. Weatherspoon, supra note 27, at 404. 
 36. For further discussion of the “pivotal role” of EEO employees, and an argument that they function as 
“lightning rods” for displacing conflict over discrimination in the workplace. See Chambliss, supra note 16, at 
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss1/1
2014] RETALIATION IN THE EEO OFFICE 9 
Other factors particular to the employer may exacerbate the vulnerability of the EEO 
employee. For example, employees who handle complaints about an allegedly discrimina-
tory action taken by the personnel office are sometimes supervised by the director of the 
personnel office, creating an additional layer of conflict.37 Another variable is the level of 
support and resources provided to the employees responsible for EEO matters. It is a fre-
quent complaint of such employees that they are not given sufficient resources and organ-
izational power to do their jobs effectively.38 With more companies outsourcing human 
resources functions, employees in these roles must continually prove their worth to man-
agement, making them especially vulnerable to charges of disloyalty in internal conflicts.39 
Race and gender relations within the organization may further complicate the work 
of the EEO employee. Many women and persons of color work in jobs with EEO respon-
sibilities.40 While their gender and racial identities do not necessarily translate into low 
organizational power, being a minority and/or female can exacerbate the vulnerability of 
the EEO employee to charges of being “biased” toward employees, especially in dealing 
with discrimination complaints by other women and people of color. 
While there are no official statistics quantifying the frequency with which EEO em-
ployees experience retaliation, the evidence that exists suggests that this is a real concern. 
A survey of EEO/affirmative action employees conducted in 1998 by Floyd Weatherspoon 
found that 67% of them believed that they had experienced reprisal for their efforts to 
further EEO goals, although only 4% actually filed an EEO complaint against their em-
ployer in response.41 Literature from the field of human resources management confirms 
that human resources professionals who take a strong stance against discrimination in their 
workplace risk jeopardizing their careers.42 Given the structural and institutional position 
of the EEO employee, such findings are not surprising. 
C. A Primer on Retaliation Law: “Opposition” versus “Participation” 
Section 704(a) of Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against 
any employee “because he has opposed any practice, made an unlawful employment prac-
tice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.”43 Courts have inter-
preted this language to set forth two distinct clauses with varying levels of protection. The 
first, the “opposition clause,” applies to employees who oppose discrimination internally, 
without invoking the formal enforcement machinery of Title VII.44 The second, the “par-
                                                          
1–3, 33. 
 37. Weatherspoon, supra note 27, at 397–98. 
 38. Id. at 393–97. 
 39. See Lynne Bennington, HRM Role in EEO: Sheep in Shepherd’s Clothing?, 65 J. BUS. ETHICS 13, 16 
(2006). 
 40. Weatherspoon, supra note 27, at 397. 
 41.  Id. at 383 n.88; see also Chambliss, supra note 16, at 36–41 (discussing a case study and examples of 
the “personalization” and “displacement” of workplace conflict onto the employer’s EEO compliance officer). 
 42.  See Bennington, supra note 39, at 16 (summarizing research findings). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) [§ 704(a)]. 
 44. See, e.g., Correa v. Mana Prods., Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 319, 327-28 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2008) (citing 
authorities). The only judicially recognized exception to this rule is for EEO complaints made by federal em-
ployees through the complaint channels within their internal agency, which some courts have treated as triggering 
the protections of the participation clause since federal government has special statutory requirements for internal 
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ticipation clause,” applies once Title VII’s formal enforcement machinery has been in-
voked through the filing of a charge with the EEOC or state enforcement agency.45 The 
dividing line between the two clauses turns on whether or not a formal charge was filed 
with appropriate government agency; if not, any claim for retaliation is governed by the 
opposition clause.46 
Title VII has played an out-sized role in the development of retaliation law under 
other discrimination statutes. To date, all federal statutes that prohibit employment dis-
crimination either have explicit language prohibiting retaliation or have been judicially 
interpreted to implicitly prohibit retaliation.47 Courts add content to retaliation bans under 
these statutes by generally adhering to the standards that have developed under Title VII.48 
Even in the absence of statutory language separating internal opposition from formal en-
forcement, courts have imported Title VII’s legal standards separating internal opposition 
from external participation and applied them to retaliation claims brought under other em-
ployment discrimination statutes.49 
For any retaliation claim, the plaintiff must prove three core elements: (1) protected 
activity; (2) adverse action; and (3) causation; that is, that the protected activity caused the 
adverse action.50 The difference between opposition clause claims and participation clause 
claims lies in the legal standards governing the first element, protected activity. By far the 
broader protection is found under the participation clause. Participating in formal enforce-
ment proceedings is fully protected, regardless of the merits of the underlying discrimina-
tion charge and regardless of the form that the participation takes.51 Some cases go so far 
as to protect employees under the participation clause even when their participation is ad-
judged to be in bad faith.52 In more recent years, courts have drawn the line at bad faith 
                                                          
EEO processes. See Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1997); Kurtz v. McHugh, 423 F. App’x. 572 
(6th Cir. 2011). 
 45. See, e.g., EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000) (participation clause 
does not apply where no EEOC charge had yet been filed); Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 
1990) (same); Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2000) (same). Courts are divided on 
the question of whether participating in an employer’s internal investigation that occurs in response to the filing 
of a formal EEOC charge falls under the participation clause. See Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 543 
(6th Cir. 2003) (yes); Clover v. Total Sys. Services, Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999) (same); but cf. 
Hatmaker v. Memorial Medical Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2010) (reserving judgment on that question). 
 46. See, e.g., Van Portfliet v. H&R Block Mortgage Corp., 290 Fed. App’x 301 (11th Cir. 2008) (“the par-
ticipation clause has no application where an employee participates only in an internal, in-house investigation 
conducted apart from a formal EEOC charge”). Indeed, filing an internal complaint pursuant to company policy 
is on the same footing as informally expressing a concern about discrimination to anyone in the workplace, with 
both actions falling under the opposition clause and governed by the same standards. See, e.g., Muhammad v. 
Audio Visual Servs. Grp., 380 Fed. App’x. 864, 872 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 47. Statutes with specific provisions banning retaliation include the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and 
the Equal Pay Act. Other statutes have been construed to implicitly encompass retaliation. See Jackson v. Bir-
mingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (Title IX); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) 
(42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008) (the federal employees provisions of the 
ADEA). 
 48. See, e.g., Preston v. Va. ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994) (Title IX); Sarno v. 
Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (ADA); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (Title VI). 
 49. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 83–84 (2005) [hereinafter Brake, Retali-
ation]. 
 50. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 485 (8th ed. 2013) (summarizing elements). 
 51. Id. at 468–70, 474. 
 52. See, e.g., Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969); Glover v. S.C. Law Enf. 170 
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and have imposed a minimal good faith requirement even for participation clause claims.53 
Nonetheless, good faith participation in formal statutory enforcement mechanisms suffices 
to establish protected activity under the participation clause, and is protected from retalia-
tory adverse action.54 
Internal opposition to discrimination triggers a different set of standards governing 
the retaliation claim. First, the person who opposed discrimination must have acted on an 
objectively reasonable belief that the conduct she opposed actually violated the law.55 
Courts apply the reasonable belief requirement harshly, using judicial precedents to strictly 
define the outer boundaries of reasonableness.56 Second, the manner of the employee’s 
opposition must be reasonable in form and not unduly burdensome or disruptive.57 This 
standard too has been criticized for circumscribing employee responses to discrimination 
and prioritizing workplace stability over employee interests in a fair and equitable work-
place.58 
On top of these well-established and generally applicable limitations on protected 
activity for internal opposition to discrimination, the employees charged with implement-
ing and overseeing internal EEO compliance now face additional restrictions on the scope 
of protected activity. Increasingly, these employees confront distinctive hurdles in demon-
strating that they engaged in protected activity in opposing discrimination. 
II. THE NO-MAN’S LAND OF THE EEO EMPLOYEE 
Against this background, the discussion below turns the spotlight on how retaliation 
law applies to the employees charged with carrying out the duties of the EEO office. Two 
recent developments threaten to undermine retaliation protection for this class of employ-
ees, with implications for the integrity of discrimination law more broadly. The first marks 
a particular iteration of the generally applicable reasonable belief requirement for opposi-
tion to discrimination. The second is a distinctive limitation that singles out the employees 
who implement and oversee anti-discrimination policies. Both of these developments, sep-
arately and together, leave EEO employees without adequate protection from retaliation 
for opposing discrimination in the course of their job duties. 
A. The Reasonable Belief Doctrine Meets the EEO Employee 
One gap in retaliation protection for EEO compliance personnel stems from the rea-
                                                          
F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 53. See, e.g., Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2010); Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 
529 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 54. See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reading Too Much into What the Court Doesn’t Write: How Some Federal 
Courts Have Limited Title VII’s Participation Clause’s Protections After Clark County School District v. 
Breeden, 83 WASH. L. REV. 345 (2008). 
 55. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
 56. See, e.g., Brake, Retaliation, supra note 49, at 86–103; Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The 
Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 913-29 (2008); Brake, Retaliation in an 
EEO World, supra note 5, at 136–57. 
 57. See, e.g., Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 1998); Argyropoulos v. City 
of Alton, 539 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2008); O’Day v. McDonnell-Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
 58. See Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 529 (2003). 
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sonable belief requirement for retaliation claims brought under the opposition clause. Le-
gal scholars have resoundingly criticized this doctrine.59 By measuring reasonableness 
against courts’ own understanding of discrimination, as reflected in existing case law, the 
doctrine holds laypersons to an impossibly strict standard of legal knowledge and sets a 
ceiling on the ability of employees to press for a conception of equal opportunity that 
exceeds the bare minimum set by law.60 However, two features of this doctrine make it 
distinctively problematic for the employees charged with EEO compliance. 
First, the employees who investigate discrimination complaints are in a uniquely 
difficult position with respect to their ability to form a reasonable belief in discrimination 
before retaliatory action can occur. Until a thorough and independent investigation is com-
pleted, an employee charged with investigating a report about discrimination can have no 
objectively reasonable belief that discrimination has actually occurred. If retaliation inter-
feres with that process before the investigation is completed, the employee who undertakes 
to perform the investigation is left without recourse under Title VII. 
A recent decision from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals illustrates the problem. 
In Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises,61 the company receptionist, Martha Diane Town-
send, made an internal complaint alleging that she was sexually harassed by the company’s 
Vice-President, Hugh Benjamin. Benjamin was a shareholder of the firm and the husband 
of the company President and co-owner, Michelle Benjamin. The allegations were serious: 
Townsend claimed that Benjamin sexually harassed her over a period of nearly two years 
and that his behavior included making sexual comments and propositions, sexual touching, 
and sexual assault. Because of the nature of the allegations and the high-level position of 
the accused employee, the complaint was rife with company politics. 
Townsend reported the harassment to the company’s Human Resources director, 
Karlean Victoria Grey-Allen. Grey-Allen took a written and oral statement from Town-
send and then contacted the state fair employment agency for guidance on how to proceed. 
At this point in the proceedings, Townsend had not yet filed a formal charge with either 
the state agency or the EEOC. In response to Grey-Allen’s inquiry about how best to pro-
ceed with the internal complaint, the state agency advised her to separate Benjamin and 
Townsend pending a full investigation. Grey-Allen followed this advice and instructed 
Benjamin to work from home until the investigation was complete. She also sought advice 
on how to handle the investigation from a management consultant retained by the firm. 
Shortly thereafter, Michelle Benjamin fired Grey-Allen. As is often the case in retaliation 
litigation, the parties disputed the real reason for the termination.62 This factual dispute 
was never resolved, however, because the retaliation claim was dismissed.63 
After firing Grey-Allen, Michelle Benjamin took over the investigation herself. She 
                                                          
 59. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, supra note 5, at 126-27 (citing critiques by other scholars). 
 60. See, e.g., Brake & Grossman, supra note 56, at 913–29. 
 61. Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., 679 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 62. The firm claimed that Grey-Allen breached confidentiality by discussing sensitive employee matters with 
the management consultant, while Grey-Allen claimed that she was fired for undertaking a meaningful investi-
gation of the sexual harassment allegations. Cf. id. at 61 (Lohier, J., concurring) (“[t]here was strong evidence 
that [the company] fired Grey-Allen for no reason other than that she conducted an effective internal investigation 
of a sexual harassment claim against a corporate vice-president”). 
 63. The district court did, however, find sufficient evidence to rule that the plaintiff had created a genuine 
issue of material fact on the issue of causation. Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19445, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 2008). 
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immediately reversed Grey-Allen’s separation order and allowed Hugh Benjamin to return 
to work, prompting Townsend to resign the next day. According to Grey-Allen, the sub-
stituted investigation was bogus and tightly controlled by Michelle Benjamin. Benjamin’s 
investigation of her husband concluded that “nothing happened” and that it was merely a 
“he said versus she said” situation.64 Both Townsend and Grey-Allen subsequently filed 
charges with the EEOC and then brought a consolidated lawsuit against the company. 
Townsend tried her case to a jury and obtained a verdict in her favor on her sexual 
harassment claim.65 Grey-Allen was not so successful; the district court dismissed her re-
taliation claim, granting the employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the 
Second Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit’s starting point was to decide which of the 
two clauses in § 704(a) applied. Analyzing the claim under the opposition clause presented 
a distinct problem. Like other courts that have ruled on this issue, the Second Circuit un-
derstood the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark County School District v. Breeden66 to 
require complaining employees, at a minimum, to possess both a subjective good faith 
belief and an objectively reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination had occurred in 
order to support a retaliation claim brought under the opposition clause.67 However, at the 
time of her actions, Grey-Allen could not have formed an objectively reasonable belief 
that discrimination had occurred because she had not yet completed the investigation into 
the allegations. Indeed, the whole purpose of the investigation was to determine whether 
sexual harassment had occurred. For this reason, Grey-Allen put all of her eggs in the 
participation clause basket.68 
However, the participation clause presented an insurmountable problem as well. At 
the time that Grey-Allen separated Hugh Benjamin from the firm and undertook the inves-
tigation, Townsend’s complaint was an internal one. As is the case with most employees 
who file discrimination complaints,69 Townsend first complained internally under the 
company’s policy, instead of going directly to the EEOC or state enforcement agency. 
Indeed, had she not proceeded this way, she would have risked losing her sexual harass-
ment claim under the affirmative defense for failing to invoke the company’s policy for 
reporting sexual harassment.70 Although Townsend later filed a charge with the EEOC 
after Grey-Allen was fired, the timing of Townsend’s EEOC charge was too late for Grey-
Allen to bring her retaliation claim under the participation clause. The Second Circuit 
acknowledged that the case presented an issue of first impression in the circuit, but ulti-
mately followed the other circuit courts that have held that participating in an internal 
employer investigation, absent a prior charge filed with the federal or state enforcement 
agency, does not amount to “participation under this subchapter” as the participation 
                                                          
 64. Townsend, 679 F.3d at 46. 
 65. She received a jury award of $30,400.00 in damages and the court awarded $141,308.80 in attorney’s 
fees and costs. The jury rejected her constructive discharge claim, however. 
 66. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
 67. Townsend, 679 F.3d at 41. 
 68. Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9441, at *13–14 (noting that Grey-Allen “con-
ceded that she was not covered by the opposition clause, because she did not know whether Townsend’s allega-
tions of harassment were true and thus lacked a good-faith belief that the discriminatory action had occurred, 
which is required for protection under the opposition clause”); see also Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31582, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2008) (“Grey-Allen concedes that she cannot claim protection 
under the opposition clause because she lacked a good faith belief that Townsend was sexually harassed.”). 
 69. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, supra note 5, at 133. 
 70. See supra text accompanying notes 2–4 for an explanation of the affirmative defense. 
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clause requires.71 With no fit under either clause, Grey-Allen’s retaliation claim failed to 
survive the employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The case illustrates how 
the reasonable belief doctrine ensnares the employees charged with handling discrimina-
tion complaints and investigations if they suffer retaliation for implementing and enforcing 
employer anti-discrimination policies. 
While the Supreme Court has shown some sensitivity to the vulnerability of employ-
ees who participate in their employers’ internal investigations of alleged discrimination, it 
has not (yet, at least) extended protection from retaliation in such circumstances in a way 
that would help employees like Grey-Allen. In Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville & Davidson County,72 the Court considered the scope of the opposition clause 
as it applies to an employee who acts as a supporting witness for the complainant in an 
employer’s sexual harassment investigation. In that case, the plaintiff was not the com-
plainant, but an employee who was interviewed in the course of the employer’s internal 
investigation into sexual harassment allegations. In response to the investigator’s ques-
tioning, the plaintiff provided information about the alleged harasser that corroborated the 
complaint. The Court ruled that the plaintiff’s statements in the investigation were a form 
of opposition to discrimination and fell within the protections of the opposition clause.73 
While the Court’s decision was essential to protect the rights of employee-witnesses 
in internal investigations, it does nothing for the employees charged with responsibility for 
handling the investigation. The role of the employee who processes the complaint and 
conducts the investigation does not fit within the model of opposition embraced by the 
Court in Crawford—at least, not for retaliatory acts taken before the investigation has con-
cluded. Nor does the Court’s reasoning help employees like Grey-Allen to find protection 
under the opposition clause in such situations. The Court decided Crawford under the op-
position clause and declined to address the plaintiff’s claim under the participation clause. 
The Court thus left in place the circuit court precedent declining to apply the participation 
clause to employers’ internal complaint processes.74 And, although the Court found that 
the plaintiff in Crawford was protected under the opposition clause, it did so without ame-
liorating the strictness of the reasonable belief doctrine as applied to non-complainants 
who participate in internal investigations. Accordingly, the Crawford decision unfortu-
nately does not preclude the result in Townsend. Indeed, the Second Circuit decided Town-
send after the Supreme Court’s decision Crawford, and did not discern any tension be-
tween the two decisions. 
There is one window of opportunity left open by the court in Townsend for an EEO 
investigator such as Grey-Allen to prevail in a retaliation claim, and that is if she had 
proceeded far enough into the investigation before being fired to have formed an objec-
tively reasonable belief that the reported discrimination had in fact occurred.75 This offers 
little by way of reassurance, however, since it creates the bizarre incentive for an employer 
                                                          
 71. Townsend, 679 F.3d at 49. 
 72. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t. of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
 73. Id. at 284. 
 74. Id. at 282. 
 75. For a contrary case where the plaintiff, a union officer, challenged retaliation for investigating a sexual 
harassment complaint and was able to satisfy the reasonable belief doctrine, see McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 
241 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2001). However, this case was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Breeden 
applying the reasonable belief doctrine. Lower court decisions post-Breeden have taken an increasingly strict 
approach to the reasonable belief requirement. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 56, at 919–29. 
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seeking to whitewash an investigation to fire its EEO investigators sooner rather than later. 
There is yet another problem with the reasonable belief doctrine as it applies to the 
employees who perform EEO responsibilities. Even without early interference into an in-
vestigation, an EEO employee can trip over the reasonable belief doctrine due to a mis-
match between the broad scope of employer anti-discrimination policies and the much 
narrower scope of anti-discrimination law. Many employer policies go well beyond the 
strict requirements of anti-discrimination law, without clear lines delineating which obli-
gations are required by anti-discrimination law and which are not. For example, EEO re-
sponsibilities often include affirmative action obligations within employer non-discrimi-
nation policies. However, retaliation law enforces a bright-line distinction between the 
two. The case of Holden v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.76 is an example of how finely the reason-
able belief doctrine parses anti-discrimination and affirmative action responsibilities, and 
the potential fall-out for the EEO employee who works on both fronts. The plaintiff in that 
case, an African American woman, had among her job duties responsibility for managing 
the employer’s affirmative action plan. As a federal contractor, the employer was required 
to have an affirmative plan by Executive Order 11,246. She was fired after just six weeks 
in the job, the district court ruled, in retaliation for too aggressively enforcing the obliga-
tions in the plan.77 The sixth circuit reversed, ruling that such actions were not protected 
under Title VII since there could be no objectively reasonable belief that a failure to im-
plement an affirmative action plan amounted to unlawful discrimination under Title VII.78 
There is a whole run of cases on this theme of denying protection from retaliation to 
a plaintiff who challenges adverse action taken in retaliation for her efforts to promote 
affirmative action.79 Because of the scope of their responsibilities, EEO employees are 
especially likely to trip over this line.80 The distinction made by the reasonable belief doc-
trine in these cases draws an artificial and overly formalistic line between affirmative ac-
tion and nondiscrimination and ignores the overlap in systemic discrimination claims, in-
cluding disparate treatment and disparate impact, blurring any such a line. The retaliation 
plaintiffs in these cases could just as easily be characterized as opposing what they under-
stand to be systemic discrimination as pursuing affirmative action. Indeed, the Executive 
Order itself, in mandating that employers adopt plans for setting goals and timetables to 
promote affirmative action, simultaneously bans discrimination, including the systemic 
varieties that Title VII reaches. 
The job responsibilities of employees charged with EEO functions are particularly 
ill-suited to the confines of the reasonable belief doctrine. Because their actions commence 
before an objectively reasonable belief in discrimination can be formed, and because they 
enforce employer anti-discrimination policies that do not dovetail with the scope of dis-
crimination law, their efforts to implement employer policies and complaint procedures 
leave them particularly vulnerable to the stringency of the reasonable belief doctrine. 
The reasonable belief doctrine is just one sticking point in retaliation law for the 
                                                          
 76. Holden v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 793 F.2d 745 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 77. Id. at 746. 
 78. Id. at 752. 
 79. See Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, supra note 5, at 146–47 (summarizing and critiquing cases). 
 80. Id. at 132–33, 147 (describing the blurred lines in EEO policies between anti-discrimination and affirm-
ative action). 
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employees responsible for EEO matters. A second and potentially more significant road-
block is a newly developing doctrine specific to this class of employees. 
B. The Manager Rule and the Step-Outside-of-Role Requirement 
The reasonable belief doctrine is just one piece of the legal puzzle confronting EEO 
personnel. Increasingly, courts have deployed a separate rule that bars certain employees 
from protection from retaliation for actions that fall within the scope of their job responsi-
bilities. Under this emerging doctrine, courts have refused to treat employees with EEO 
responsibilities as opposing discrimination when they act in their employer’s interest to 
enforce and implement anti-discrimination policies. These kinds of retaliation claims typ-
ically arise under the opposition clause, since the participation clause does not apply to 
internal complaint processes. The rule courts have applied to exclude these employees 
varies in its articulation and reasoning, but is most often phrased as a requirement that 
managers acting in the course of their job responsibilities must do something extra to step 
outside their role in order to secure protection from retaliation. It is not clear what that 
“something” is. However, lack of clarity is not the only problem. Stepping outside an em-
ployee’s assigned role presents problems of its own. The result is a vastly diminished level 
of protection for the affected employees. 
A recent example of this doctrine, described by the court as “the manager rule,” 
comes from an Eleventh Circuit decision, Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp.81 The plaintiff in 
that case, Janet Brush, was tasked with conducting an internal investigation into a sexual 
harassment complaint. As the investigation unfolded, the allegations turned out to be more 
serious than they first appeared, involving multiple instances of rape by a supervisor on 
company premises. Brush soon came to loggerheads with company officials over whether 
to report the rape allegations to the police; Brush advocated informing the police, while 
company officials refused, citing the complainant’s desire for confidentiality and the in-
complete status of the investigation. Sears terminated Brush, allegedly in retaliation for 
taking a strong stance on how Sears should respond to the sexual harassment investiga-
tion.82 After she was fired, invoking the opposition clause, Brush filed a retaliation charge 
with the EEOC, which issued a reasonable cause determination in her favor. The lower 
court granted summary judgment to the employer, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on 
the grounds that Brush acted in her role as a manager with responsibility for investigating 
the harassment charges, and therefore did not engage in protected activity under the oppo-
sition clause.83 
In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit proceeded in several steps. First, 
the court described Brush’s dispute with Sears as “a disagreement with the way in which 
Sears conducted its internal investigation” into the sexual harassment allegations.84 This 
characterization treated their dispute as a minor, procedural matter rather than a substan-
tive disagreement over how an employer should respond to rape allegations.85 A more 
                                                          
 81. Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 Fed. App’x. 781 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 82. The complaint alleged that “she uncovered that [Sears] had negligently allowed three forcible rapes to 
occur on its premises and did nothing about it,” and that Brush and Sears had a dispute over how to handle the 
investigation, most prominently, about whether to report the rapes to the police. Id. at 784. 
 83. Id. at 789. 
 84. Id. at 786. 
 85. In this respect, the case differs significantly from a case relied on by the court, Entrekin v. Panama City, 
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favorable spin for Brush would have emphasized that she opposed Sears’ decision to 
downplay several instances of alleged workplace rape. Seen in this light, Brush’s position 
could just as easily be characterized as opposing discrimination, since Title VII requires 
employers to take prompt, appropriate action in response to workplace harassment, and 
the sufficiency of the response depends on the seriousness of the harassment. 
The next step in the court’s reasoning has broader implications. The court expressed 
its agreement with other courts that have adopted the manager rule, holding that an em-
ployee does not engage in protected activity when she disagrees with or opposes the em-
ployer’s actions in the course of her normal job responsibilities.86 To engage in protected 
activity, such an employee must “cross the line” from performing her job to “‘lodging a 
personal complaint.’”87 Having endorsed the manager rule, the court placed Brush’s ac-
tions firmly within this doctrine, noting that she acted “solely as a manager here” in inves-
tigating the complaint and stayed within her job duties.88 
While relatively new to Title VII, this doctrine does not come entirely out of the 
blue. It has roots in other areas of employment law. A brief look at its development in 
other areas of law sheds light on its entry into Title VII. 
1. Digging up the Doctrine’s Employment Law Roots 
The leading case cited in Brush and other Title VII courts applying the manager rule 
is a Tenth Circuit case decided in 1996 under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
McKenzie v. Renberg’s, Inc.89 The plaintiff in McKenzie was a personnel director who 
urged her employer to correct what she believed were FLSA violations in the recording 
and payment of employee overtime. Like Title VII, but in somewhat different language, 
the FLSA bars retaliation against employees acting to enforce the statute.90 The Tenth 
Circuit rejected the retaliation claim because the plaintiff’s actions fell within her job du-
ties as personnel director. To be protected from retaliation, the court explained, an em-
ployee must step outside her role representing the company and cross the line to take action 
adverse to her employer, such as by lodging a FLSA complaint herself.91 Since the plain-
tiff’s job responsibilities included overseeing wage and hour compliance, her actions—
reporting wage and hour violations to management and making efforts to bring the com-
pany into compliance—were not protected under the statute. 
Another Tenth Circuit case decided the following year elaborated on the contours of 
the rule. That case distinguished McKenzie to hold that a food clerk’s actions reporting 
                                                          
Fla., 376 Fed. App’x. 987 (11th Cir. 2010), in which that court ruled that the plaintiff’s disagreement with the 
employer about the proper policy for reporting a sexual harassment complaint (to a superior officer or directly to 
the human resources department) did not amount to protected activity. In Entrekin, the dispute was more clearly 
procedural, with no connection to a particular stance on the merits of the underlying harassment complaint or the 
appropriateness of the employer’s response to it. 
 86. Brush, 466 Fed. App’x. at 787. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. McKenzie v. Renberg’s, Inc., 94 F.3d 1478 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 90. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (forbidding a covered employer to “discriminate against any employee be-
cause such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding” under the 
statute). In 2011, the Supreme Court interpreted this language to encompass oral as well as written complaints, 
taking a broad reading of the language, “filed any complaint.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 131 
S. Ct. 1325 (2011). 
 91. McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486-87. 
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wage and hour violations were protected because his job responsibilities did not include 
oversight of wage and hour compliance.92 Rather, the court considered his actions to be a 
“personal complaint about the wage and hour practices” of the employer, and the “unoffi-
cial assertion of rights through complaints at work.”93 The McKenzie rule, as applied, 
draws a sharp line between actions taken in the course of official oversight duties, which 
are not protected, and out-of-role opposition, which is protected. The scope of the plain-
tiff’s job duties, as defined by the employer, determines which side of the line the conduct 
touches.94 
Numerous FLSA cases have since followed suit, using the plaintiff’s job description 
as the decisive factor in determining whether the activities are protected from retaliation 
under the statute.95 In one case representative of this trend, the plaintiff, a human resources 
employee for Wal-Mart, complained that the store was fudging employee time records to 
save overtime pay in violation of the FLSA.96 According to the plaintiff, her complaints 
were met with deaf ears. She expressed frustration to her supervisor, going so far as to say 
that she would not be comfortable testifying in support of Wal-Mart in a pending wage 
and hour case involving a former employee. The plaintiff was not asked to testify, but she 
was demoted and then fired.97 The key paragraph in the court’s reasoning captures the 
wide berth this rule gives to employers in dealing with the employees charged with FLSA 
compliance responsibilities: 
 
[P]laintiff’s expressions of concern or discomfort or frustration over her 
employer’s wage and work hour reporting practices . . . do not amount to 
the requisite adversarial assertion of statutory rights. Plaintiff’s expressions 
of concern, even if characterized as “complaints,” were made in her capac-
ity as Personnel Training Coordinator. She appears to have been appropri-
ately cautioning her superiors about improprieties with an eye toward cor-
recting them and minimizing the risk of liability. Even her expressed 
apprehensions about the possibility of testifying were a matter of frank and 
honest disclosure, for her employer’s benefit as well as her own.98 
 
                                                          
 92. Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., 121 F.3d 1390 (10th Cir. 1997). See also Samons v. Cardington Yutaka Techs., 
2009 WL 961168 (S.D. Ohio April 7, 2009) (finding no FLSA protected activity by a human resources employee 
and distinguishing EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1992), which found protected 
activity where a custodian, not responsible for HR matters, reported alleged FLSA/Equal Pay Act violations). 
 93. Id. at 1394. 
 94. See, e.g., Haynes v. Crescent Real Estate Equities, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91381 (S.D. Texas July 2, 
2012) (examining scope of plaintiff’s job duties to determine whether her complaints about FLSA compliance 
were protected activity under the statute); Lasater v. Tex. A&M Univ. Commerce, 495 Fed. App’x. 458 (5th Cir. 
2012) (“voicing concerns” about FLSA compliance did not step outside manager’s role for purposes of estab-
lishing protected activity under FLSA). 
 95. See, e.g., Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 628 (5th Cir. 2008) (ruling that the plain-
tiff/manager did not step outside his role in bringing forward possible wage/hour violations, and stating “[v]oic-
ing each side’s concerns is not only not adverse to the company’s interests, it is exactly what the company expects 
of a manager”); Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, Ltd., 375 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2004) (engineer with 
responsibility for approving pay invoices of contractor-employed guards did not step outside his role in refusing 
to sign timesheets he believed wrongly excluded overtime pay; in alerting employer to the potential FLSA vio-
lation, he acted out of concern for protecting the company from liability). 
 96. Robinson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 759 (W.D. Mich. 2004). 
 97. As is typical in these cases, the parties disputed the issue of causation, with the plaintiff alleging a retali-
atory reason for her dismissal and the employer claiming it acted on a legitimate reason. Id. 
 98. Id. at 763. 
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This amounts to a sweeping exclusion of compliance personnel, broadly defined, 
from the retaliation protection of the FLSA. Like the other courts that have proceeded 
down this path, the court relied on McKenzie.99 
A parallel development has occurred in constitutional free speech protections for 
public employees and is contributing to an acceleration of similar manager exemptions 
from retaliation protections in other areas of law. In a case that has been extensively criti-
cized for chipping away at public employee free speech protections, Garcetti v. Ce-
ballos,100 the Supreme Court ruled that a public employee’s speech falling within the scope 
of the employee’s job duties is not protected by the First Amendment.101 In that case, the 
plaintiff was an assistant district attorney who complained about misconduct within the 
district attorney’s office. The Court reasoned that, to support a public employee’s free 
speech claim, the speech must be adverse to the employer and exceed the employee’s nor-
mal employment role. Nancy Modesit has termed this development “the Garcetti virus” 
for its subsequent contagious flight into other areas of employment law, although she did 
not single out Title VII law as a grounding point in that journey.102 Decided a decade after 
McKenzie applied essentially the same rule to retaliation claims under the FLSA, Garcetti 
has further propelled the influx of the manager rule into retaliation protections under anti-
discrimination statutes.103 
From McKenzie and Garcetti, and the cases following them, it was a short leap to 
statutory protections for opposing discrimination. 
2. The Manager Rule’s Migration to Discrimination Law 
Tracking these trends, the manager rule has now stepped into Title VII retaliation 
law full bore. As in Brush, the plaintiff in such cases is typically in the human resources 
field, charged with EEO oversight and compliance. A representative example is Correa v. 
Mana Products, Inc.,104 in which the plaintiff, a human resources manager, alleged that 
                                                          
 99. See, e.g., Stewart v. Masters Builders Ass’n of Kin and Snohomish Cntys., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (W.D. 
Wash. 2010) (employee with supervisory responsibilities did not step outside his role so as to act adverse to 
employer when he contacted state fair labor agency on behalf of subordinate employees to question the em-
ployer’s conferral of FLSA-exempt status to certain employees; he acted within his job responsibilities and his 
communication to management emphasized that he was acting in the best interests of the company to protect it 
from FLSA liability); George v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Franklin Cnty., Kan., 2007 WL 950270 (D. Kan. 
Mar. 26, 2007) (plaintiff, assistant director of ambulance services for the county, did not step outside his role 
when he raised FLSA violations that forced the county to change its policy and respond to a lawsuit brought by 
others in which it had to pay backpay; plaintiff did not bring an individual complaint of his own and did not step 
outside his role of representing the company); Samons v. Cardington Yutaka Techs., 2009 WL 961168 (S.D. 
Ohio April 7, 2009) (plaintiff, senior manager of administration with human resources responsibilities, did not 
step outside her role so as to engage in protected activity by merely bringing potential FLSA violations to the 
company’s attention). 
 100. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 101. For critiques of Garcetti, see Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE 
W. RES. 375, 428-29 (2010); Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 244-45 (2009); Orly 
Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Organizations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 
433, 453–55 (2009); Nancy M. Modesit, The Garcetti Virus, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 137 (2011). 
 102. Modesit, supra note 101. 
 103. See, e.g., Cook v. CTC Communications, Inc., 2007 WL 3284337 (D.N.H. Oct. 20, 2007) (using Garcetti 
to support applying a requirement that a manager step outside of her role in order to support a retaliation claim 
under USERRA and the FMLA, although acknowledging a lack of precedent applying the rule to those statutes); 
id. (discerning in Garcetti the broad principle that “complaints made within an employee’s job cannot form the 
basis of a retaliation claim”). 
 104. Correa v. Mana Products, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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she was fired for handling employee grievances that led to the filing of discrimination 
charges against the company. The plaintiff alleged that the company’s vice president told 
her that she was being fired because the company president believed that she had sided 
with the employees who filed the discrimination charges. However, the court noted that 
she did not actively encourage the employees to file the charges, nor did she even believe 
that the employees in question had actually experienced discrimination.105 The court’s rea-
soning, however, is much broader, explaining that the plaintiff did not engage in protected 
opposition because she acted within her job duties in writing up and shepherding employee 
EEO grievances through the complaint process, and did not step outside her role suffi-
ciently so as to come within the protections of the opposition clause.106 In dismissing the 
retaliation claim, the court characterized her actions as supportive of the company’s anti-
discrimination policy, and therefore not in opposition to the interests of the employer. Like 
the court in Townsend, the court made short order of the plaintiff’s participation clause 
claim, since the employees’ complaints were made internally.107 The Correa court’s rea-
soning gives employers a wide berth to pressure the employees in charge of EEO compli-
ance into discouraging and minimizing complaints, rewarding them when complaints go 
away and punishing them when they do not. 
Other courts have used similar reasoning to deny retaliation protection. In Vidal v. 
Ramallo Brothers Printing, Inc.,108 the plaintiff, a human resources director, was fired after 
informing the president and vice-president of the company that he was investigating sexual 
harassment complaints that other employees had made against them. The plaintiff alleged 
that after notifying the president and vice-president of the complaints, they ordered him 
not to investigate, saying that they would handle the matter themselves. They fired him 
later that afternoon. The court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss on the grounds 
that the plaintiff had not engaged in protected activity because he did not step outside his 
role, which included responsibility for handling and investigating sexual harassment com-
plaints under the company’s anti-harassment policy.109 The court’s opinion is short but 
sweeping: as human resources director, working for the benefit of the company and pur-
suant to its sexual harassment policy, the plaintiff’s actions were within his job responsi-
bilities and not adverse to the company. The court distinguished the actions of an employee 
in the plaintiff’s position who filed a discrimination complaint on his own behalf, which 
would be protected, from merely reporting or investigating the discrimination complaints 
of others, which was not protected under Title VII. 
                                                          
 105. Id. at 327-28. 
 106. Id. at 330. For support, the court cited an earlier Title VII precedent with hints of a manager rule. See 
Nelson v. Pima Community College, 83 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1996). That court ultimately ruled against the plain-
tiff for lack of causation, but added, in dicta, that an employee whose job involves handling discrimination com-
plaints does not engage in protected activity under Title VII and may be fired for handling such complaints in a 
manner contrary to the employer’s instructions. The court distinguished actions made on behalf of the employer 
in the course of performing job duties from the protected activity of an employee whose job does not include 
such duties but who pursues such matters anyway. 
 107. Even if the plaintiff had written her internal reports in anticipation that they would be discoverable in a 
later formal enforcement proceeding, the court explained, “passively” writing up reports on discrimination 
charges would still be unprotected. 
 108. Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D. P.R. 2005). 
 109. Id. at 62.  
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An Employee Assistance Program Consultant faced a similar predicament in De-
masters v. Carillion Clinic.110 After advising a fellow employee that what he had experi-
enced was sexual harassment and expressing criticism of the employer’s handling of the 
complaint, the plaintiff was terminated for “fail[ing] to perform or act in a manner that 
was consistent with the best interest of [the employer],” since his advice may have 
prompted the employee’s filing of a sexual harassment lawsuit against the employer.111 
The court followed Brush, holding that the employee did not engage in protected activity 
under Title VII. 
This kind of reasoning is cropping up increasingly in Title VII cases. A recent deci-
sion from the Western District of Pennsylvania placed another human resources profes-
sional outside of Title VII’s retaliation protections for handling discrimination complaints 
and enforcing EEO policies. In Bradford v. UPMC,112 the plaintiff’s job responsibilities 
included investigating discrimination complaints. The employer moved to exclude evi-
dence of these activities on the ground that her investigations and recommendations related 
to such matters could not qualify as protected activity because they fell within her job 
responsibilities. Because of the procedural posture of the case—the motion was before a 
new judge, after a prior judge assigned to the case had denied the employer’s motion for 
summary judgment—the court’s actual holding was contingent on whether the prior judge 
had already foreclosed the employer’s motion under the “law of the case.” If not, the court 
indicated it would grant the employer’s motion, since it agreed that the plaintiff’s investi-
gations of other employees’ discrimination complaints and her resulting recommendations 
could not amount to protected activity. The court repeated the mantra that, as a professional 
in charge of EEO matters, the plaintiff must “‘step outside’ her normal role in order to be 
considered as opposing unlawful activity.”113 
Having taken hold in Title VII retaliation cases, this doctrine is now spreading to 
other anti-discrimination statutes, including Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, prohibiting sex discrimination in federally funded education institutions. In 2005, 
when the Supreme Court recognized the availability of retaliation claims under Title IX, 
it did not set out the elements of a claim under Title IX or the principles for discerning 
them. Lower courts have filled this gap by analogizing to Title VII retaliation law. That 
course has led to the importation of the manager rule into Title IX retaliation law. 
For example, in one such case, Atkinson v. Lafayette College,114 a former college 
athletic director brought a retaliation claim alleging that she was fired for her efforts to 
strengthen the athletic department’s compliance with Title IX. Like other lower courts 
deciding retaliation claims under Title IX, the court looked to Title VII principles for guid-
ance. The court found no protected activity on the part of the plaintiff “because she never 
                                                          
 110. Demasters v. Carillion Clinic, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133660 (W.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2013). 
 111. Id. at *9. 
 112. Bradford v. UPMC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5790 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2008). 
 113. Id. at *10. See also Samons, v. Cardington Yutaka Techs., 2009 WL 961168 (S.D. Ohio April 7, 2009) 
(dismissing Title VII retaliation claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but noting in dicta that it 
would also likely fail for lack of protected activity where the plaintiff, a senior manager of administration with 
human resources duties, did not step outside her role in acting to address possible gender discrimination, and 
specifically noting that the step-outside-role rule from FLSA cases has been applied to Title VII retaliation 
claims); Weeks v. Kansas, 503 Fed. App’x. 640 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying the manager rule to reject a Title VII 
retaliation claim brought by a general counsel alleging that she was fired because her employer did not like the 
advice she provided regarding unlawful discrimination against an employee). 
 114. Atkinson v. Lafayette Coll., 653 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
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engaged in activity that was either adverse to the College or outside the scope of her posi-
tion as Athletic Director.”115 As precedent for this principle, the court threaded together 
Garcetti’s limitation on public employee first amendment protections with the ruling from 
McKenzie and its progeny curbing statutory retaliation protections for employees who act 
within their job responsibilities.116 The result, once again, is a wholesale exemption from 
retaliation protections for employees whose actions opposing discrimination fall within 
their job descriptions. Under the court’s reasoning, filing a personal complaint or lawsuit 
would fall outside of such an employee’s job duties, but other compliance efforts would 
not.117 Since the plaintiff “never stepped outside of her role as Athletic Director to put the 
College on reasonable notice of potential legal action relating to any Title IX issues,” she 
did not engage in protected activity.118 
In addition to Title IX, the manager rule, coupled with the requirement that such 
persons step outside their role in order to engage in protected activity, has been applied to 
retaliation claims for actions opposing other discrimination statutes, such as the Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) and the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA).119 It is quickly on its way to becoming a fixture in discrimi-
nation law’s treatment of retaliation. 
3. The Logical Expansion to Managers Beyond Specialized EEO Personnel 
The logic of the manager rule is not limited to an employer’s official EEO or human 
resources staff; any managerial employee with responsibility over the work environment 
and personnel issues is vulnerable. It was only a matter of time before the rule extended 
beyond officially-designated human resources or EEO personnel to reach a broader class 
of managers. In Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing, Alabama, LLC,120 the court ap-
plied the rule to an employee who directed the purchasing and parts operation of an auto 
plant. The plaintiff, a white male supervisor at the Korean-owned company, had brought 
forward a variety of discrimination complaints from the workers he supervised, including 
allegations of preferential treatment of Korean workers over non-Korean workers and al-
legations of sexual harassment and bias toward female employees. He claimed that he 
experienced adverse action as a result of these actions. The court rejected his retaliation 
claim, viewing his actions as part of his managerial responsibility to alert the company to 
any allegedly unlawful conduct that could potentially hurt it. The court noted the absence 
of evidence that the plaintiff “stepped outside of his role as a director and asserted a right 
adverse” to the company.121 Rather, it was his job “to bring to the management roundtable 
                                                          
 115. Id. at 596. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 596–97 (“this would include the filing of a complaint, but not reporting suspected discrimination to 
a supervisor”). 
 118. Because Title IX compliance was part of the plaintiff’s job, the court required the plaintiff to meet a 
“‘heightened’ burden of showing that her actions put the College on notice that litigation against it, due to Title 
IX violations, was a ‘reasonable possibility.’” Id. at 599. The Court did not specify what kind of actions in con-
nection with litigation would meet this heightened standard. 
 119. See, e.g., Cook v. CTC Commc’ns Corp., 2007 WL 3284337 (D.N.H. Oct. 20, 2007) (dismissing retalia-
tion claim under the FMLA because the plaintiff did not step outside her role as a human resources professional 
in her enforcement efforts, but allowing her to proceed on her USERRA retaliation claim because she did step 
outside her role in refusing to terminate a worker for taking military service leave). 
 120. Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33826 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2008). 
 121. Id. at *37. 
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areas of concern in the workplace.”122 The scope of the company’s anti-discrimination pol-
icy reinforced the court’s conclusion that the manager did not act out of personal opposi-
tion to discrimination, but rather in the company’s own interest.123 The court noted that the 
plaintiff’s actions bringing forward a female assistant manager’s complaint of sex bias 
merely complied with his obligation under the company’s harassment policy, which re-
quired him to report such complaints up the chain of command. 
Another court applied the rule to a general manager, not specializing in EEO matters, 
whose job responsibilities included reporting any complaints about unfair treatment, in-
cluding discrimination, pursuant to company policy. In Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores East, 
L.P.,124 the plaintiff, an assistant store manager, contacted the company’s labor relations 
department to report subordinate employees’ complaints about discrimination, instead of 
simply directing the complaining employees to read and follow the store’s anti-discrimi-
nation and harassment policy. She was later criticized by a store manager for going “over 
her head” and reporting the complaints to another department, and was subsequently ter-
minated. The court ruled that she did not engage in protected activity since the company’s 
policy required allegations of discrimination to be reported to persons outside of the im-
mediate store hierarchy. Consequently, the plaintiff “did not step ‘outside of her assigned 
responsibility,’ or cross the line from performing her job to lodging a personal com-
plaint.”125 
As these cases suggest, the logic of the manager rule applies to all supervisors with 
responsibility for reporting and addressing their subordinates’ concerns about discrimina-
tion, not just to managers specializing in human resources and EEO fields. Depending on 
the scope of the employer’s anti-discrimination policy, this could include employees in 
any management-level position.126 While some courts have resisted applying the doctrine 
so sweepingly,127 its logic is not easily confined to official EEO personnel, especially if 
company policies place obligations broadly on managerial employees to report alleged 
discrimination and to monitor the work environment for violations of company policy. 
III. DOCTRINAL INCOHERENCE AND THE SEARCH FOR A LIMITING PRINCIPLE 
If the manager rule applied to all supervisory employees, as its logic would suggest, 
it would decimate the law’s protection from retaliation. However, courts have not followed 
the doctrine’s logic to that extreme and have instead flailed about for a limiting principle. 
So far, no coherent limiting principle has emerged. This section argues that the search for 
a limiting principle to this doctrine is futile. The fundamental difficulty is that discrimina-
tion statutes are set against the backdrop of the common law regime of at-will employment. 
                                                          
 122. Id. at *34. 
 123. Id. at *52-53. 
 124. Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50974 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2013). 
 125. Id. at *25. 
 126. Cf. Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 628 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[A] part of any management 
position often is acting as an intermediary between the manager’s subordinates and the manager’s own superi-
ors,” such that voicing the concerns of other employees is “not only not adverse to the company’s interests, it is 
exactly what the company expects of a manager.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Collazo v. Bristol-Myers, 617 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2010) (declining to apply the manager rule 
where plaintiff was not a personnel manager, but a scientist, helping a subordinate fill out a complaint to human 
resources); Howe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 355 (W.D. Wisc. Jan. 3, 2014) (declining to 
apply the manager rule to an assistant store manager and noting that courts generally have only applied the rule 
to managers in human resources and personnel, and not to managers in other fields). 
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In that system, employers can terminate or otherwise take adverse action against an em-
ployee for any reason, with the exception of those reasons which would violate the specific 
limits set by statute. Retaliation law bars adverse action taken for a retaliatory reason, 
while leaving employers free to act on other reasons. Adverse action that is motivated by 
employee job performance is the paradigm of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. A 
typical retaliation case, if it goes to a jury, requires the fact-finder to sort out whether the 
adverse action was taken because of the plaintiff’s protected activity in opposing discrim-
ination or because of the plaintiff’s job performance. The problem with applying the man-
ager rule is that, in this class of cases, job performance cannot be meaningfully separated 
from opposition to discrimination. This section explores these difficulties. 
A. Clearing the Bar, but Without Principled Limits 
In some cases, employees with EEO responsibilities have succeeded in securing pro-
tection from retaliation for their opposition to discrimination. In these cases, courts have 
either applied the manager rule but found that the plaintiff stepped far enough outside her 
role to secure protection, or they have found protected activity without mentioning the 
manager rule at all. In none do they settle on an adequate solution to the difficulties raised 
by the manager rule. 
Cases decided prior to the 1990s do not mention the manager rule, nor do they 
acknowledge any special rules that would require EEO employees to depart from their job 
duties in order to secure protection from retaliation. In these cases, courts do not purport 
to treat the employees responsible for employer anti-discrimination policies any differ-
ently than other employees. For example, in Coleman v. Wayne State University,128 a per-
sonnel director was protected from retaliation for voicing his concerns about the univer-
sity’s discriminatory hiring practices and noncompliance with its affirmative action policy. 
This court did not mention the overlap between the alleged protected activity and the plain-
tiff’s job description as a problem. 
As the manager rule has taken shape, however, some courts have managed to rule in 
favor of employees with EEO responsibilities by more finely parsing the step-outside-of-
role requirement with factual distinctions. While some plaintiffs have managed to clear 
the bar in this way, these pro-plaintiff cases provide little guidance for employees whose 
duties include overseeing compliance with employer nondiscrimination policies. Instead 
of offering principled limits, these cases reveal unresolved tensions and dilemmas. 
One path taken by courts is to manipulate the employer “policy” in order to find that 
the plaintiff acted adversely to it and therefore in “opposition” to the employer. Under this 
approach, the result turns on whether the plaintiff’s actions are described as falling within, 
or going against, the employer’s policy. This, in turn, depends on how the employer “pol-
icy” is defined—as the official policy of non-discrimination or the managerial policy that 
the plaintiff is opposing. Rather than forthrightly acknowledge the threshold issue of how 
to classify and describe the employer’s policy, and that the classification drives the result, 
the courts engage in an opaque process of manipulation. 
                                                          
 128. Coleman v. Wayne State Univ., 664 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D. Mich. 1987). 
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For example, in one case decided in favor of the plaintiff, EEOC v. HBE Corpora-
tion,129 the court found that the plaintiff, a personnel manager, engaged in protected activ-
ity when he disobeyed an order to fire an African American manager for reasons he be-
lieved were discriminatory. The court distinguished the seminal McKenzie case on the 
grounds that McKenzie was a case in which the plaintiff “merely alerted management of 
potential violations of the law in order to avoid liability for the company.”130 Since the 
normal managerial role is to further company policy, the court reasoned, a refusal to im-
plement company policy meets the step-outside-of-role requirement. However, the court 
did not acknowledge that its analysis turned on what it credited as the company “policy”—
the written nondiscrimination policy, which the plaintiff acted to further, or the allegedly 
discriminatory actions taken by high-level employees (and in violation of the official non-
discrimination policy) which the plaintiff opposed. Only by treating the relevant policy as 
the directive to fire the subordinate could the court say that the plaintiff engaged in a re-
fusal to implement company policy, thereby affording him protection from retaliation.131 
But the employer’s “policy” could just as easily have been the company’s official nondis-
crimination policy, which the plaintiff acted to further within the scope of his job duties. 
Not surprisingly, HBE has been a difficult case to distinguish for courts applying the 
manager rule to find plaintiffs outside the scope of protection. These courts have distin-
guished HBE by foregrounding the employer’s nondiscrimination policy, and the plain-
tiff’s responsibilities under it, to place plaintiffs on the losing side of the line. In the Cyrus 
case discussed above, for example, the court distinguished HBE by explaining that the 
plaintiff here followed company policy when he acted within his job duties as a supervisor 
to report possible discrimination.132 Likewise, in Vidal, also discussed above, where the 
plaintiff disobeyed direct orders from the company’s principals not to proceed with a sex-
ual harassment investigation, the court emphasized that he did so consistently with the 
employer’s sexual harassment policy.133 In cases like these, the employer’s adoption of 
broad internal anti-discrimination policies operates to relieve the employer from account-
ability for retaliating against the employees who enforce and apply those policies. How-
ever, no principle emerges from the case law for explaining why, in determining whether 
the plaintiff acted in opposition to the employer’s policy, the relevant policy is sometimes 
the allegedly discriminatory practice and sometimes the official anti-discrimination policy. 
A different—but no more satisfying—approach is to base the plaintiff’s success in 
meeting the manager rule on whether the court classifies the plaintiff’s efforts as “active” 
or “passive” in opposing discrimination. This distinction, too, is elusive, with similar ac-
                                                          
 129. EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 130. Id. at 554. 
 131. For another case taking this approach, see Foster v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 250 F.3d 1189, 1195 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (upholding retaliation verdict for the plaintiff under the Americans with Disabilities Act where the 
plaintiff, a customer service supervisor, “stepp[ed] outside the normal role of a manager” when she refused to 
enforce a new sick leave policy, and instead followed the employer’s anti-discrimination policy, which encour-
aged the type of accommodation she offered to an employee with epilepsy). 
 132. That court also distinguished Conner, a case in which the plaintiff engaged in protected activity by re-
porting FLSA violations, a task that did not fall within his job duties, for the same reason—that the plaintiff here 
acted pursuant to company policy in reporting it. Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS, at *38 (M.D. Ala. April 24, 2008). 
 133. Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D. P.R. 2005). 
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tions falling on both sides of the line. A representative case is Cook v. CTC Communica-
tions Corporation,134 which involved one plaintiff bringing three retaliation claims under 
three different statutes. As the starting point, the court explained that the plaintiff, a human 
relations manager, had to show that she stepped outside of her role when she took various 
compliance-related actions under each of these statutes. The court proceeded to finely 
parse her actions, finding that she satisfied this obligation under two of the statutes, but 
not under the third. One of the successful claims was for actions taken to comply with the 
Uniformed Services Employment Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The plaintiff 
had blocked a colleague’s attempt to terminate an employee for missing work due to mil-
itary leave and refused her superior’s instruction to “dig up” performance problems for 
this employee so as to sidestep a potential USERRA violation. She also questioned a man-
ager’s effort to classify certain employees as exempt from the requirements of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and contacted the Department of Labor about her suspicions, 
which confirmed the employees’ coverage under the statute. The court found that these 
actions taken pursuant to these two statutes veered far enough outside the plaintiff’s role 
of supporting the company’s mission to qualify as protected activity.135 On the other hand, 
the court ruled that a third set of activities did not qualify as protected activity because the 
plaintiff did not do enough to step outside her role. The unprotected actions entailed refus-
ing to falsify records to terminate an employee who took leave authorized by the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), challenging the legality of plans to fire another employee 
who took FMLA leave, and reporting her concerns about FMLA violations internally to a 
superior. The court characterized these actions as merely “rais[ing] a concern” about ac-
tions she believed were unlawful, but not “actively refus[ing] to follow” the employer’s 
instructions.136 The distinction is elusive. 
The court applied the same rule to the retaliation protections under all three statutes. 
And yet, the plaintiffs’ compliance efforts were very similar under all three statutes, con-
sisting of challenging managerial actions that she perceived to violate each statute. The 
court faltered in explaining why the plaintiff’s compliance efforts in the first two instances 
were any more “active” than her efforts with respect to FMLA compliance. The courts 
efforts to do so only showcase the implausibility of separating “active” refusals to counte-
nance discrimination from more “passive” compliance with the employer’s nondiscrimi-
nation policy. 
Other courts have found their way around the manager rule by finding that the plain-
tiff ventured far enough beyond her job responsibilities, as defined by the employer, to 
succeed in stepping outside her role, and thereby engaged in protected activity under the 
statute. Courts taking this path require the employee to do more than what is needed to 
oversee compliance with anti-discrimination policies, or to do it in a way that departs from 
the ordinary course of the job. In one case where the plaintiff met this standard, Johnson 
v. County of Nassau,137 the plaintiff was the director of the county hospital’s “Office of 
Diversity.” The job required him to serve as a liaison between upper-management and 
                                                          
 134. Cook v. CTC Commc’ns Corp., 2007 WL 3284337 (D.N.H. Oct. 20, 2007). 
 135. Id. at *9. 
 136. Id. at *11. 
 137. Johnson v. County of Nassau, 480 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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employees in their complaints about discrimination. He brought a retaliation claim alleg-
ing that he was transferred and demoted for repeatedly raising his fellow employees’ com-
plaints about race discrimination, including, in one instance, at a public meeting of the 
hospital’s board of directors. The court found that he engaged in protected activity based 
on his act of speaking up at the public meeting, relying on the fact that the meeting oc-
curred outside of his professional responsibilities as head of the Diversity Office.138 The 
court took pains to note that the plaintiff expressed his concerns during the public portion 
of the meeting, which suggested that he did so outside his official role. The court added 
that, in the course of criticizing the hospital for not investigating black employees’ com-
plaints of race discrimination, “he did not make a presentation about his work activities.”139 
This way of parsing the manager rule, however, creates a grave dilemma for the EEO 
employee. Handling discrimination complaints and/or enforcing employer anti-discrimi-
nation policies in a manner that exceeds the employee’s job duties, or veers from the ordi-
nary course of performing them, clashes with another doctrinal limit on protected activity 
under the opposition clause, that the employee not cross the line into disloyalty or disrup-
tion, but express opposition in a form that is reasonable and proportionate.140 This tension 
is discussed in greater detail in part III.B., below. 
More than any principled limit, what is driving the plaintiff-friendly cases decided 
under the manager rule is the concern that there has to be a stopping point somewhere, lest 
the rule swallow up protection from retaliation for supervisory employees acting in oppo-
sition to discrimination pursuant to employer anti-discrimination policies. The pro-plain-
tiff cases are driven more by a determination to draw the line somewhere than by the logic 
of where to draw it. 
An example of a court caught in the throes of this dilemma, and floundering in ex-
plaining why it hoists the plaintiff over the line, is Johnson v. University of Cincinnati.141 
In this case, the plaintiff was Vice President of Human Resources, with responsibility for 
promoting diversity and ensuring compliance with the university’s affirmative action and 
anti-discrimination policies. Although the Sixth Circuit did not refer to the manager rule 
by name, it overturned the district court’s ruling that a university affirmative action direc-
tor does not engage in protected conduct by acting within his job responsibilities, which 
included advocating for minority rights.142 The appellate court was clearly troubled by the 
implications of such a holding for cutting back on retaliation protection.143 However, the 
                                                          
 138. Id. at 602. 
 139. Id.  
 140. See, e.g., Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976); 
Velez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 389 F. Supp. 2d 253 (D. PR 2005); Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 
1986); Burns v. Blackhart Mgt. Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 427 (S.D. Miss. 2007). 
 141. Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 142. Id. at 586. 
 143. Id. at 577. 
. . . an employer inclined to engage in invidious discrimination in the workplace could hire 
an affirmative action official in order to convey the false impression that the employer is 
interested in eliminating illegal discrimination from the workplace, and proceed to retaliate 
against the official secure in the knowledge that no legal claim could be lodged against the 
employer for its actions. Thus, to hold that a high-level affirmative action official cannot 
bring a Title VII claim for discrimination based upon his or her advocacy of women and 
minorities would be to invite stratagems designed to circumvent, and indeed, to violate law 
which was designed to serve . . .  
Id.   
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court’s reasoning merged its analysis of protected activity on the retaliation claim with its 
analysis of the plaintiff’s claim of race and sex discrimination based on his association 
with, and furtherance of the rights of, minorities and women. Instead of directly engaging 
the lower court’s ruling on the implications of the plaintiff’s job responsibilities for the 
retaliation claim, the Sixth Circuit invoked third-party associational standing precedents 
to conclude that Title VII’s coverage of status-based discrimination encompassed penal-
izing an employee for his “association with a member of a recognized protected class.”144 
While understandable, given the court’s concern for preserving statutory retaliation 
protection for employees like Johnson, this is an over-reading of the associational standing 
cases, all of which involved a white employee penalized for have a close relationship with 
a person of color, based on the courts’ implicit assumption that the employee was penal-
ized for associating with persons of a different race.145 The application of that reasoning to 
Johnson, an African American affirmative action officer who advocated for women and 
minorities, is a stretch, since the plaintiff’s theory of harm did not rest on any causal link 
to his own race. With its attention absorbed in the fancy footwork required to support 
associational standing, the court’s treatment of the retaliation claim was submerged in its 
analysis of the discrimination claim.146 This move enabled the court to side-step the issue 
of how the plaintiff’s job duties affected the retaliation claim. Unlike the majority, the 
dissenting judge highlighted the plaintiff’s job responsibilities, pointing out the absence of 
any evidence that the plaintiff’s advocacy “went beyond the scope of his employment.”147 
On that point, the majority responded cursorily, stating, “simply because it was Plaintiff’s 
job to insure that Defendants did not engage in discriminatory hiring practices the likes of 
which Defendants had previously been found to employ, does not thereby immunize De-
fendants from retaliating against Plaintiff for doing his job.”148 
The Johnson decision is best understood—albeit not explained by the court in these 
terms—as a wholesale rejection of the manager rule rather than a roadmap for discerning 
                                                          
 144. Id. at 574. 
 145. See, e.g., Zielonka v. Temple Univ., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16732, at *15–19 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2001) 
(disagreeing with the Johnson court’s treatment of third-party standing in interracial association cases, and ex-
plaining that a discrimination claim based on an employee’s interracial relationship must nevertheless be tethered 
to the plaintiff ‘s race, and citing supporting authorities). Cf. Andrew M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1194 (2007) (in defense of the author’s statutory interpretation argument, which the author 
describes as not “a knockout” but also not “wholly ridiculous,” citing Johnson and noting that the reasoning in 
that case is “a greater departure from the text than my reading”). 
 146. Johnson, 215 F.3d at 575. 
Indeed, . . . the fact that Plaintiff has not alleged discrimination because of his race is of no 
moment inasmuch as it was a racial situation in which Plaintiff became involved—Plain-
tiff’s advocacy on behalf of women and minorities in relation to Defendant’s alleged dis-
criminatory hiring practices—that resulted in Plaintiff’s discharge from employment.  
Id. The court ventured further down the rabbit hole in explaining why a white affirmative action officer also 
would have a discrimination claim if penalized for the same actions, since “the race of the minorities for which 
he was advocating would be ‘imputed’ if you will to the Caucasian high-level affirmative action official.” Id. In 
support of its reasoning, the court cited a 42 U.S.S. §1981 case decided in 1977, a time long before the Supreme 
Court recognized the availability of retaliation claims under that statute, in which the Court held that a white 
employee fired for opposing the discriminatory treatment of an African American colleague had standing to sue 
for race discrimination. Today, courts would likely treat such a situation as a retaliation claim, rather than using 
third-party standing to frame it as a claim for status-based discrimination. 
 147. Id. at 587 (Kennedy, Circuit Justice, dissenting). 
 148. Id. at 576 n.6. See also id. at 579 (“the fact that Plaintiff may have had a contractual duty to voice such 
concerns is of no consequence to his claim”); id. at 580 (“the individual who has contracted to advocate on behalf 
of women and minorities has not thereby contracted to be retaliated against for his advocacy”). 
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principles for limiting or distinguishing it. The result in Johnson ultimately boiled down 
to the majority’s concern about the implications for retaliation law, and by extension dis-
crimination law, if the plaintiff were exempted from protection from retaliation because of 
his job duties in overseeing the employer’s anti-discrimination policy. In that event, the 
court cautioned, employers could “retaliate against the person best able to oppose the em-
ployer’s discriminatory practices—the high-level affirmative action official—without fear 
of reprisal under Title VII.”149 
Rather than setting forth a principled basis for limiting and distinguishing the man-
ager rule, the cases where plaintiffs prevail reflect the judgment, made explicit by the court 
in Johnson, that unless the doctrine is cabined, it creates a substantial loophole in retalia-
tion protections, whereby employers can benefit from having antidiscrimination policies 
while retaliating against the persons who implement them. 
While some courts have seen their way clear to lift plaintiffs over this hurdle, others 
have not. Rather than provide EEO employees a way out of the manager rule, the lines 
courts have drawn to rule in favor of plaintiffs create additional dilemmas for employees 
and reveal deeper tensions within in the doctrine. These issues are explored below. 
B. Tracing the Fault Lines in the Doctrine 
Without clear lines for discerning when an EEO employee steps outside her role so 
as to side-step the manager rule, courts have cited a host of reasons for finding the plaintiff 
on the wrong side of the line. These lines reveal the dilemmas confronting employees who 
experience retaliation because of their job-related efforts to address discrimination in the 
workplace. 
One factor courts turn to in explaining the scope of protection, or lack thereof, is the 
employee’s motivation for opposing discrimination and whether it is characterized as per-
sonally motivated or not. The relevance of the employee’s motivation, however, is far from 
clear. Certainly, using the plaintiff’s motivation to determine whether opposition to dis-
crimination qualifies as protected activity is without basis in the statutory language. Such 
a distinction is also at odds with the purpose of retaliation law to encourage enforcement 
of anti-discrimination law. Unless the action is taken in bad faith, the precise motivation 
for opposing discrimination should not matter. While the employer’s motivation is para-
mount—whether the employer acted for a retaliatory motive or a legitimate motive is a 
core element in proving the claim—the employee’s motive for opposing discrimination 
has never been an element of the retaliation claim. As long as the employee acts intention-
ally and not by accident (which is only likely to become an issue in artfully constructed 
classroom hypotheticals), the reason for an employee’s good-faith opposition to discrimi-
nation should not matter. 
Nevertheless, some courts applying the manager rule have used the employee’s mo-
tivation to support a finding that the employee failed to step far enough outside her role to 
evade the strictures of the manager rule. These cases purport to distinguish opposition to 
discrimination that is undertaken for personal reasons from that which is motivated by a 
desire to serve the employer’s interests. As a mediating principle, this distinction circles 
back to the intractable problem of identifying the relevant employer “policy” to use as the 
                                                          
 149. Id. at 580. 
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benchmark for deciding whether the employee acted in furtherance of, or opposition to, 
the employer’s policy. It is neither workable nor desirable to separate personal interest 
from an interest in serving the employer as distinct motivations for opposing discrimina-
tion. In an era when anti-discrimination policies are the norm, employees’ efforts to secure 
compliance with these policies could always be explained as motivated by the welfare of 
the company. If that were enough to discredit protected activity, the law’s protection 
against retaliation would wither. 
The cases in which courts attempt to parse the plaintiff’s reasons for opposing dis-
crimination demonstrate the folly of this enterprise. In Stein v. Rousseau,150 for example, 
the court denied the plaintiff, a general manager, protection from retaliation for raising 
FLSA compliance issues because he acted out of concern for the company’s potential lia-
bility and not out of his own separate interests. The court discerned in his statement, 
“we’ve got a big problem here,” a motivation to act on behalf of, and not adverse to, the 
company.151 Another court attempted to parse a line separating self-interested motives 
from the interest of the employer in Van Portfliet v. H&R Block Mortgage, Inc.,152 with 
equally poor reasoning. The employer there argued that the plaintiff, a sales supervisor, 
acted within his job responsibilities under the company sexual harassment policy when he 
reported sexually harassing behavior that targeted an employee he supervised. The court 
ultimately avoided having to decide the case on the manager rule by relying on the reason-
able belief requirement to overturn the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff. But the court never-
theless opined that the plaintiff’s self-oriented motivation might have saved him from the 
manager rule by allowing him to argue that he stepped outside his supervisory role. The 
court explained, in dicta, “[m]oreover, it is unclear that such a rule would be applicable in 
this case because, while the plaintiff testified that he was obligated by company policy to 
report misconduct, he also said that he reported [the district manager’s] conduct because 
it personally upset him.”153 The court’s distinction supposes a non-existent line separating 
“personal opposition to unlawful harassment” and implementing the employer’s anti-har-
assment policy.154 If this reasoning carries the day, woe to the employee who forgets to 
describe his efforts to enforce a company sexual harassment policy in terms of his “per-
sonal” feelings against harassment. 
Applying the manager rule to favor employees who act out of personal motivation 
is not only incoherent, it also creates additional dilemmas for employees. A different re-
taliation doctrine, requiring employees to clearly identify discrimination as the source of 
their opposition, has used employee motivation in the opposite direction. Using this doc-
trine, plaintiffs have occasionally been penalized for acting out of self-interest, which is 
used to undermine their claim of engaging in protected activity. The court in Hill v. IGA 
Food Depot155 penalized the plaintiff for purportedly acting out of a self-interested motive, 
                                                          
 150. Stein v. Rousseau, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54939 (E.D. WA. Aug. 8, 2006). 
 151. Id. at *5. See also id. (stating that the plaintiff “did not offer his opinion for the benefit of any specific 
employee. Rather, he offered it for the benefit of the company as a whole in his capacity as one of the company’s 
managers”). 
 152. Van Portfliet v. H&R Block Mortg., Inc., 2007 WL 2773995 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2007). 
 153. Id. at *8. 
 154. Id. In the end, however, given its disposition of the case, the court found “no reason for wrestling with a 
problematic issue.” Id. 
 155. Hill v. IGA Food Depot, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80455 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2006). 
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which undercut his expression of opposition to discrimination. That court listed the plain-
tiff’s personal motivation for opposing the allegedly discriminatory hiring of cashiers, 
since his daughter had applied for such a position, among its reasons for ruling against 
him. The court flagged his impure motivation in a messy analysis of why he did not do 
enough to clearly identify discrimination as the subject of his complaint, which therefore 
fell outside the opposition clause.156 Characterizing the plaintiff’s inquiry about the lack 
of African American cashiers as a vague and overly general grievance, the court suggested 
that he was motivated by his daughter’s application and not a more principled stance 
against discrimination. The decision, while unsupported by the text and purpose of the 
retaliation claim, shows the risks to plaintiffs of expressing a personal interest in opposing 
discrimination. 
A different doctrine poses an even greater threat to employees seeking to bridge the 
gap by stepping outside their roles and responsibilities over EEO matters—and this one 
has a firmer footing in established law. An employee who acts out of personal motives, or 
who in other respects goes beyond what is required by her job description, risks charges 
of acting disloyally to the employer. Indeed, as the earlier discussion of EEO role conflicts 
reveals, it is a very fine line separating the performance of EEO responsibilities from dis-
loyal actions. Acting disloyally to the employer is itself a basis for denying employees 
protection from retaliation, and EEO employees have been especially vulnerable to 
charges of disloyalty. The retaliation doctrine in which this concern is couched requires 
the form of the opposition to be reasonable and proportionate under the circumstances. 
Courts have recognized this as an independent limit under the opposition clause, insisting 
that the manner of opposition must be reasonable in nature and not disproportionate or 
unduly disruptive.157 
This requirement, limiting the form of the opposition from straying too far into dis-
ruption and disloyalty, is in tension with the entire project of the manager rule. By requir-
ing employees with EEO responsibilities to step outside their role to find cover in protected 
activity, the rule butts right up against the limit on the form of opposition. And indeed, the 
EEO employee who steps outside the role set by her job description risks losing the retal-
iation claim on the grounds of insubordination and disloyalty. 
An early case brought by EEO employees, Pendleton v. Rumsfeld,158 foreshadows 
the problem. Decided in 1980, at a time before employer nondiscrimination policies were 
quite so common, the plaintiffs brought a retaliation claim against the federal government, 
which did have extensive EEO policies and procedures. The plaintiffs were EEO counse-
lors who had participated in a demonstration highlighting the unequal employment oppor-
tunities available to minority employees in the Department. The court ruled that their ac-
tions were not protected from retaliation by Title VII, emphasizing the fine line that EEO 
                                                          
 156. Id. at *17. 
 157. See Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1985) (Title VII does not protect plaintiffs 
who violate legitimate company rules, disobey orders, or otherwise disrupt the work environment). For a sam-
pling of cases applying this limit, that the form of the opposition be reasonable, see Booker v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs are not protected when the opposition violates 
legitimate employer rules, disrupts the work environment, or interferes with the employer’s goals); Shoaf v. 
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 746, 754–55 (M.D. N.C. 2003) (plaintiff’s action of releasing confidential 
information to another employee who had charged the employer with discrimination was not protected opposition 
since it breached the employer’s trust). For a critique of this doctrine, see Smith, supra note 58. 
 158. Pendleton v. Rumsfeld, 628 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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personnel must straddle, remaining responsive to their fellow employees while still retain-
ing the trust of management.159 While acknowledging the difficulty of this “dual” role, the 
court explained that EEO employees must not become so “militant” that they stray from 
their “quasi-management” role. The court accepted the employer’s judgment that the plain-
tiffs’ participation in the demonstration compromised their ability to retain the confidence 
of management. While the court did not articulate the later-framed manager rule, the 
court’s ruling nevertheless functions to effectively preserve the same space for employers 
to react to employee job performance and deny protection to EEO employees, albeit com-
ing at the issue from the opposite direction.160 Instead of faulting the employees for not 
stepping outside their roles as EEO counselors, the court allowed the employer to penalize 
them for stepping outside their roles as EEO counselors. The court drew the line where it 
did out of a desire to keep retaliation law from insulating insubordinate employees from 
legitimate employer actions when they go too far in siding with employees on EEO mat-
ters. The more modern cases applying the manager rule reflect this same concern, although 
they pursue a path from the opposite direction to get to the same destination.161 
The tension in the doctrine is pronounced: under the manager rule, EEO personnel 
must depart from their roles to have protection from retaliation, such as by acting out of 
personal motivation and not company-interest; but under the requirement that the form of 
opposition be reasonable, an employee who veers too far from her delegated role and acts 
against her employer’s interest risks losing protection on the grounds of insubordination 
and disloyalty.162 At best, the line separating an adversarial stance in EEO compliance ef-
forts from unreasonable disloyalty is an elusive one. There is slim, if any, distance between 
stepping outside the employee’s EEO role and crossing into the territory of insubordina-
tion. The cases applying the manager rule demonstrate the futility of the endeavor. 
In one example of such a case, Samons v. Cardington Yutaka Technologies,163de-
cided under the FLSA, the plaintiff was a senior manager of administration with human 
resources duties. She alleged retaliation for bringing several potential FLSA violations to 
the attention of the company, but lost her retaliation claim because she never stepped out-
side her role as a human resources manager. The court acknowledged that she went so far 
as to write a report concluding that the employer had engaged in FLSA violations, which 
prompted a hostile reaction from the employer. However, the court emphasized that she 
never filed a FLSA claim herself, on behalf of herself or others, and fell short of acting in 
an adversarial capacity against the employer. This kind of fact pattern illustrates the pre-
dicament facing employees charged with compliance responsibilities under discrimination 
statutes. An employee who takes stronger measures than the plaintiff in Samons to oppose 
discrimination pursuant to an employer policy might succeed in meeting the requirements 
of the manager rule, which Title VII has imported from the FLSA. But in the process she 
                                                          
 159. Id. at 158. 
 160. Although the doctrinal underpinnings of the court’s ruling were somewhat cryptic, the court decided the 
case under the requirement, mentioned above, that opposition be undertaken in a form that is not unreasonable. 
Judge Wald dissented. 
 161. See, e.g., Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson Caribe Ltd., 375 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying manager 
rule to protect employer’s prerogative to discipline employee who continued to refuse to sign employee time-
sheets even after reporting his concern that employees were being denied overtime pay in violation of the FLSA). 
 162. See, e.g., Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). See 
also Smith, supra note 58 (critiquing this doctrine and the cases applying it). 
 163. Samons v. Cardington Yutaka Technologies, 2009 WL 961168 (S.D. Ohio April 7, 2009). 
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will likely run afoul of the competing injunction to act reasonably and within the proper 
boundaries of employer loyalty.164 
The sweet spot for stepping outside the employee’s role without crossing over into 
disloyalty is not easy to discern. One of the cases cited with approval in Atkinson, the Title 
IX retaliation case applying this doctrine, discussed above, illustrates the difficulty. The 
Atkinson court found guidance from Hill v. Belk Store Services, Inc.,165 which placed an 
onerous burden on an employee to go beyond his normal compliance job duties to gain 
protection from retaliation in a wrongful discharge claim brought under state tort law. The 
court in Hill ruled that the store’s safety expert acted within his scope of employment when 
he investigated and reported safety hazards at the worksite, and therefore ruled against him 
on the wrongful discharge claim. In formulating the rule for the wrongful discharge claim, 
the court looked to Title VII precedent, explaining that “actions within the scope of an 
employees [sic] duties are not protected for the purpose of Title VII.”166 The court found 
that the plaintiff did not step outside his normal compliance role despite allegations that 
his employer knew that he was assisting the state OSHA office in investigating the 
worksite and that he had complained to that office. It is hard to imagine what more a Title 
VII plaintiff could do in a similar situation without raising charges of disloyalty and in-
subordination. 
The underlying problem is not just that the room for employees to navigate is slim, 
but that there is no distance separating the EEO employee who steps outside her role from 
the landmine of insubordination. In a case decided before the manager rule took shape, 
Jones v. Flagship International,167 a court denied retaliation protection to an EEO manager 
because she “gave aid and comfort, if not outright encouragement, to [another employee] 
to pursue her grievances against the company, at a time when Jones’ duty was to discour-
age and defend such claims . . . .”168 Rather than finding that these actions cut in favor of 
protecting the plaintiff, the court found them to support a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason 
for the adverse action, that the plaintiff had been insubordinate and disloyal. 
The tension between the manager rule, which requires EEO employees to depart 
from their normal roles, and the withdrawal of protection from retaliation for disloyal and 
insubordinate actions, traces back to an intractable incoherence: the impossibility of sepa-
rating a retaliatory motive from a legitimate motive where the plaintiff’s job duties include 
opposing discrimination. 
C. What Lies Beneath: The Causation Conundrum and the Clash with Employment-at-
Will 
The doctrine’s incoherence is not simply a matter of courts being lax or unprincipled 
                                                          
 164. See, e.g., Smith v. Singer Co., 650 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal of retaliation complaint 
where plaintiff, director of industrial relations with responsibilities over company’s affirmative action and EEO 
programs, himself filed complaints with the EEOC and OCCD (under the Executive Order); the plaintiff’s job 
was to ensure voluntary compliance, not external enforcement, and in pursuing the latter, he crossed the line into 
an adversarial role against the company); Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff’s 
actions repeatedly bypassing supervisor in reporting complaints to management was unreasonably disruptive and 
not protected under Title VII’s opposition clause). 
 165. Hill v. Belk Store Servs., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79239 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 12, 2007). 
 166. Id. at *3–4. 
 167. Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 168. Id. at 724; see also Baranek v. Kelly, 1987 WL 17546 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 1987). 
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in articulating the limits of the manager rule. Rather, it stems from the underlying problem 
that employers’ delegation of EEO compliance responsibilities to employees makes it im-
possible to separate legitimate concerns about job performance from retaliatory motives. 
The retaliation claim in these cases butts up against the overarching legal framework of 
employment-at-will, in which statutory law purports to impose discrete limits on employer 
conduct. In this muddle, the manager rule functions to preserve at least some room for the 
employment-at-will rule to govern the employees charged with EEO responsibilities. 
However, it does so by imposing a blanket exclusion from retaliation protection on an 
ever-growing class of employees. The result is a crisis in the integrity of the internal EEO 
policies and complaint procedures that discrimination law so heavily incentivizes. 
When it is part of an employee’s job to ensure compliance with the law and with the 
employer’s own policies against discrimination, the task of parsing causation in a retalia-
tion claim becomes incoherent. The protected activity—opposing discrimination—merges 
seamlessly into the employee’s job performance. Although the retaliation claim purports 
to treat the issue of whether the employee engaged in protected activity separately from 
the question of causation, judicial anxiety about causation pervades these cases, driving 
the courts to short-circuit a determination on causation by finding, as a threshold matter, 
an absence of protected activity. 
The court’s opinion in Atkinson, the Title IX retaliation case discussed above, in 
which the court denied protection from retaliation to a college athletic director who pressed 
the college to do more to comply with Title IX, provides a good example of how the in-
tractability of causation drives the doctrine on the manager rule.169 In support of its finding 
that the athletic director did not engage in protected activity under Title IX, the court char-
acterized her dispute with the college as a disagreement over how—not whether—to com-
ply with Title IX.170 The court viewed the college’s hostility toward her efforts—especially 
her actions mobilizing student support—as an appropriate response to insubordination ra-
ther than a retaliatory response to protected activity.171 Although the court did not say so 
explicitly, the very impossibility of distinguishing opposition to discrimination from job 
performance fueled the court’s determination to stop retaliation law from cutting too 
deeply into the ability of employers to supervise the persons charged with anti-discrimi-
nation compliance. As the court observed, “[t]o now suggest that [the plaintiffs’] actions 
constituted protected activity would open the College to a lawsuit any time it terminated 
someone hired in such a compliance role.”172 
                                                          
 169. Atkinson v. Lafayette Coll., 653 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 170. Id. at 602. In the course of explaining why she did not step outside her role and therefore did not engage 
in protected activity, the court observed, “[p]laintiff never suggested that the College opposed her Title IX ef-
forts.” Id. at 599. But that statement does not square with the plaintiff’s actual claim, which was that she was 
fired for advocating for increased funds to expand women’s sports, or alternatively, to cut certain men’s sports 
to bring the program into compliance. 
 171. The court’s discussion of the issue of whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, which turned on 
whether she stepped outside her role, is infused with its skepticism about her proof of causation: 
Undoubtedly, Plaintiff repeatedly and aggressively raised issues regarding the College’s 
noncompliance with Title IX in the athletic department.  She fails to recognize, however, 
that this advocacy was, in part, precisely what the College hired her to do.  Although the 
changes she sought required substantial effort on her part, nothing in the evidence before 
the Court suggests that the College ever opposed her efforts or sought to avoid Title IX 
compliance. 
Id. at 600. 
 172. Id. Cf. Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (protecting plaintiff from 
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Without some gate-keeper for retaliation claims by EEO employees, opposition to 
discrimination would be indistinguishable from the performance of job duties. It is not just 
a question of where to draw the line, but that there is no coherent line between an imper-
missible reason for taking adverse action (retaliation for opposing discrimination) and a 
legitimate one (disapproval of the employee’s job performance in handling EEO respon-
sibilities). For employees whose job responsibilities include EEO oversight, one slides 
unstoppably into the other. By making a threshold determination of no protected activity, 
the court in a case like Atkinson can side-step the incoherent question of whether the reason 
for the adverse action was the plaintiff’s opposition to discrimination or how she per-
formed her job duties. The drive to preserve the umbrella of at-will-employment over em-
ployees charged with anti-discrimination duties ultimately lies beneath the courts’ turn to 
the manager rule.173 
While it would be tempting to argue that the manager rule should be abandoned in 
favor of a forthright focus on causation, the very incoherence of the causation inquiry in 
these cases makes that unworkable. And indeed, the facts of Matta v. Snow,174 applying 
the manager rule to a Title VII retaliation claim, demonstrate the validity of employers’ 
legitimate interests in retaining control over how employees perform EEO job duties. The 
plaintiff there was an EEO specialist at the U.S. Department of Treasury, and the court’s 
description of the facts suggests that the employer may well have had legitimate job-re-
lated reasons for terminating him. Some of the plaintiff’s communications appeared overly 
emotional and unnecessarily combative, and the agency had concerns about his impartial-
ity, neutrality, and reliability in performing his duties. But instead of probing causation 
and considering whether a legitimate reason motivated the employer’s adverse action, the 
court fell back on the sweeping rationale that is typical for these cases, stating that actions 
taken within the scope of an employee’s job duties do not qualify as “opposition” to dis-
crimination under Title VII.175 As another court explained, if such employees were pro-
tected, the human resources manager, or other employees with EEO responsibilities, 
would become virtually untouchable, a result that would intrude too deeply into the em-
ployment at-will common law baseline.176 
Illuminating the causation problem underlying the doctrine places these cases in a 
different light. To the extent judges are failing to articulate principled lines, it is because 
they are engaged in an impossible task. Reconsider Johnson, the case discussed above in 
which the plaintiff, an affirmative action officer, managed to prevail in his retaliation 
claim, despite the court’s convoluted reasoning and lack of engagement with the manager 
rule. The majority and dissent found themselves on opposing sides of an intractable di-
                                                          
retaliation for performing his EEO functions, but noting that “[t]his is not a case in which evidence suggests [that 
he] devoted excessive time to his EEO duties”). 
 173. See, e.g., Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 628 (5th Cir. 2008) (warning of the “litigation 
minefield” if employees with FLSA oversight responsibilities could engage in “protected activity” under the 
statute). 
 174. Matta v. Snow, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36194 (D. D.C. Dec. 16, 2005). 
 175. Id. at *75–76. 
 176. Correa v. Mana Prods., Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2008). Cf. Whatley v. Metro. 
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 632 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that Title VII does not prevent an employer 
from firing an employee whose job it is to handle discrimination complaints when the employee does this con-
trary to the employer’s instructions). 
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lemma. For the majority, exempting employees in these cases from the protections of re-
taliation law would mean that employers could gain the benefit of anti-discrimination pol-
icies while punishing the employees who implement and oversee them. But at the same 
time, as the dissent in Johnson explained, “it was [the plaintiff’s] job to advocate on behalf 
of minorities,” and the employer had every right to fire him for not doing his job to its 
liking. Both sides are right. 
Given that the underlying difficulty in these cases is the impossibility of parsing 
causation, we might ask why the manager rule emerged as the vehicle for mediating the 
clash between retaliation law and employment-at-will. Why haven’t the courts acknowl-
edged the intractability of causation in these cases, instead of developing an amorphous 
requirement that managers with EEO responsibilities must step outside their role as a pre-
requisite to obtaining protection from retaliation? The answer traces back to just how en-
trenched internal EEO policies and processes have become, both in practice and in dis-
crimination law. Acknowledging the incoherence of causation in these cases would expose 
the crisis in retaliation law created by the privatization of policies and processes for ad-
dressing discrimination. As internal employer antidiscrimination policies have become 
fixtures in the workplace, and discrimination law increasingly incentivizes and defers to 
them, more employees are involved in the work of implementing these policies. When 
they do so more vigorously than their employers would like, they are vulnerable to retali-
ation; and yet, their claims do not fit the model of retaliation law, which proscribes retali-
atory motives but leaves free reign over employee job performance. For courts to openly 
recognize the incoherence of applying retaliation law to these employees would call into 
question the soundness and integrity of the internal governance model for handling dis-
crimination. And that train left the station long ago. 
Despite the incoherence of the doctrine—the impossibility of separating job perfor-
mance from opposition to discrimination when one’s job is to oppose discrimination—
there is a real function that the doctrine is serving, despite the inconsistencies and gaps it 
creates in retaliation law. Courts are engaged in a surreptitious balancing act that weighs 
employers’ interests in retaining control over EEO personnel against employees’ interests 
in carrying out EEO policies free from retribution. While the weighing of employers’ and 
employees’ interests is inherently part of the balancing act that animates retaliation law, 
the manager rule hides that it is even occurring. And the sweepingly pro-employer balance 
that the rule strikes does not adequately account for the benefits employers reap from hav-
ing such policies in place. Nor does it accord with the widely-shared perception, thanks to 
a stream of largely pro-employee Supreme Court retaliation cases, that there is a pro-em-
ployee tilt in retaliation law. 
The biggest problem with retaliation law’s failure to protect EEO employees is that 
it magnifies the risk that employers will co-opt internal compliance regimes for their own 
benefit, retaining the veneer of legitimacy but undermining their independence. Between 
the manager rule and the distinctive problems with the reasonable belief doctrine in this 
setting, current trends in the law leave EEO employees highly vulnerable to retaliation. 
Retaliation law fails employees like Grey-Allen in the Townsend case, who undertake a 
serious, independent investigation into a discrimination complaint but encounter retalia-
tion before they can complete it. And for the EEO employee who escapes the Townsend 
trap, a more difficult hurdle awaits: an employee whose job duties require her to report, 
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investigate, or remedy discrimination must step outside her role to gain protection under 
the opposition clause. But the cases leave little or no space between stepping outside that 
role and crossing into insubordination, disloyalty and unsatisfactory job performance. The 
result is an expanding no-man’s land for employees who experience retaliation in the 
course of performing EEO responsibilities. 
To date, the case law has done a dismal job of responding to the tensions underlying 
this doctrine. There is indeed a legitimate concern that applying retaliation protections to 
persons who job involves enforcing nondiscrimination guarantees could overly constrain 
employers in their ability to monitor and control how these employees perform their jobs. 
However, excluding employees with EEO responsibilities from retaliation protection 
strikes a massive blow to the scope of retaliation law, especially in light of how broadly 
employer policies delegate reporting and oversight responsibilities to employees. The re-
sulting gap in retaliation protection raises important questions about the role internal gov-
ernance has come to play in supplanting formal legal enforcement and shielding employers 
from liability. It also raises renewed questions about the relationship between legal pro-
tection from discrimination and the law’s protection against retaliation. 
IV. TWO PATHS DIVERGE: RETALIATION AND DISCRIMINATION LAW AT CROSS-PURPOSES 
Until recently, the core teaching from the Supreme Court’s retaliation cases has been 
that strong protection from retaliation is an integral and necessary part of a legal regime 
prohibiting discrimination. In a trilogy of cases beginning in 2005, the Court has inter-
preted general statutory bans on discrimination to implicitly encompass protection from 
retaliation, going so far as to equate the two conceptually. In the first of these cases, Jack-
son v. Birmingham Board of Education,177 the Court interpreted Title IX, which prohibits 
discrimination based on sex in federally-funded education programs but omits any specific 
mention of retaliation, to implicitly include a ban on retaliation. The Court reasoned that 
punishing someone for complaining about sex discrimination is itself a form of sex-based 
discrimination.178 Two later cases followed this line of reasoning to find protection from 
retaliation to be an inherent part of a general statutory ban on discrimination.179 
In several cases decided since Jackson, the Court broadly interpreted statutory bans 
on retaliation within discrimination statutes, overcoming significant textual hurdles to do 
so.180 The Court emphasized in these cases the instrumental connection between discrimi-
nation and retaliation, explaining that broad protection against retaliation is necessary for 
the effective enforcement of discrimination law.181 Altogether, within the past decade, the 
Court has decided seven retaliation cases in which it has embraced broad protection from 
retaliation as an essential, core component of the anti-discrimination project.182 
                                                          
 177. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
 178. Id.  
 179. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (§ 1981); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 
474 (2008) (the federal sector provision of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633(a). 
 180. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 
131 S. Ct. 863 (2011); Crawford v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271 (2009); 
Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 181. See Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, supra note 5, at 122–25. 
 182. Id. 
37
Brake: Retaliation in the EEO Office
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
38 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1 
The Court’s most recent retaliation case, however, de-couples the two sets of pro-
tections and sets retaliation law on a separate track. Instead of a convergence, this case 
warns of cross-purposes in the two bans. In Nassar v. University of Texas Medical Cen-
ter,183 the Court decided that Title VII’s more plaintiff-friendly causation framework for 
discrimination claims does not apply to retaliation claims. Rather than adopt the motivat-
ing factor standard that applies to mixed-motive cases alleging status-based discrimination 
under Title VII, the Court ruled that retaliation claims require proof of but-for causation, 
a more difficult standard for plaintiffs to meet.184 Part of the Court’s reasoning warned that 
aligning the proof requirements for the two claims would encourage frivolous retaliation 
claims and detract from the enforcement of discrimination law.185 The Court’s reasoning 
struck a very different tone from its previous retaliation cases. For the first time, the Court 
viewed the two claims as in competition with one another, instead of seeing them as es-
sential parts of an integrated whole. The decision marks a significant departure from the 
Court’s conceptualization of retaliation as a form of status-based discrimination in Jack-
son.186 The different proof structures the Court adopted in Nassar for retaliation and dis-
crimination would not make sense if the Court still viewed the two prohibitions as part and 
parcel of the same anti-discrimination project. 
The developments in retaliation law discussed in this article are part of this shift 
away from the unification of retaliation and discrimination, and toward a widening gulf 
between the two sets of protections. The dismantling of retaliation coverage for the em-
ployees overseeing EEO compliance has taken place against the backdrop of expanding 
internal anti-discrimination policies and their integration into the external law of employ-
ment discrimination. As discussed previously, over the past two decades, discrimination 
law has firmly committed itself to incorporating employer policies and procedures into the 
substantive determination of employer liability.187 This incorporation of internal policies 
is consistent with the law’s conceptualization of discrimination as intentional, invidious, 
and discrete.188 But the shift to internal oversight of discrimination complaints is in tension 
with retaliation law, which restricts employer autonomy in carrying out internal govern-
ance. The overlay of retaliation law on top of the EEO workplace reveals the disconnect 
between the internal governance model of discrimination law, which equates internal anti-
discrimination policies with substantive compliance, and retaliation law, which regulates 
employer responses to discrimination complaints. In this tension, discrimination law’s em-
brace of internal governance has won out, closely tracking the common law’s employ-
ment-at-will default of maintaining employer control over employee job performance. 
In the doctrinal snare of retaliation law as applied to EEO employees, the tensions 
created by the internal governance model and its incompatibility with retaliation law have 
come home to roost. The difficulty sorting out retaliation law in this setting reveals the 
underlying fragility of the union between retaliation and discrimination as intertwined, 
mutually reinforcing concepts. The Court’s teachings from Jackson, which were never 
                                                          
 183. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 184. Id. at 2522, 2532–33. 
 185. Id. at 2531–32. 
 186. Justice Kennedy, who dissented in Jackson, wrote the majority opinion in Nassar. 
 187. See supra text accompanying notes 1–11. 
 188. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (2008). 
38
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss1/1
2014] RETALIATION IN THE EEO OFFICE 39 
fully elaborated, have been cut short. The core insight from Jackson and its progeny re-
mains powerful: legal protections from retaliation and discrimination serve the same pur-
poses, and protection against the former is essential to securing the law’s protection from 
the latter. But that lesson never disrupted discrimination law’s embrace of internal policies 
and complaint processes as indicators of substantive compliance with the external law, nor 
the expectation of employer autonomy in overseeing internal policies and complaint pro-
cesses. 
Short of walking back discrimination law’s embrace of internal governance, the best 
hope for getting retaliation law back on track—and at least curbing somewhat the oppor-
tunities for employer interference with internal EEO compliance—is to replace the current 
law’s virtual exclusion of EEO employees from retaliation protection with a more forth-
right, transparent balancing of employer and employee interests. Such a balancing should 
factor in the central role now played by internal anti-discrimination policies in the external 
law. As Justice Souter recognized in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville 
and Davidson County, Tennessee,189 without meaningful protection from retaliation, inter-
nal antidiscrimination policies would become a mere sham, undermining the integrity of 
the legal framework that incentivizes them.190 Absent protection from retaliation, the em-
ployees who administer these processes are vulnerable to pressures to implement them in 
a way that accords with an employer’s self-serving desire to whitewash claims and silence 
potential complainants.191 
Instead of an inscrutable rule requiring managers with EEO responsibilities to step 
outside their role in order to gain protection from retaliation, these employees should be 
protected when they act reasonably within their job responsibilities to address discrimina-
tion complaints under employer anti-discrimination policies. Despite its flaws, reasona-
bleness—which would effectively function as a just-cause rule in this area of job respon-
sibilities—would at least be a fairer gate-keeper than the current retaliation doctrines 
policing these claims. It would still preserve some space for employer oversight of em-
ployee job performance, while protecting the integrity of internal anti-discrimination pol-
icies by allowing the employees who implement them reasonable room to do so. Reason-
ableness in this setting should be calibrated by the professional norms of EEO employees 
and the scope of the particular employer’s anti-discrimination policies. Both the em-
ployee’s understanding of discrimination and the manner of responding to complaints 
should be reasonable, in light of professional norms and the scope of the employer’s anti-
discrimination policies. Because the responsible EEO employee does not pre-judge a dis-
crimination complaint, the reasonableness standard advocated here should not permit em-
ployers to intervene with retaliatory action to cut short an investigation. In a case like 
                                                          
 189. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271 (2009).   
 190. Id. at 273–76. However, Crawford has not been viewed by lower courts as foreclosing application of the 
manager rule to employees implementing and overseeing EEO policies. See, e.g., Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 
466 Fed. App’x. 781 (11th Cir. 2012); Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores, E., L.P., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50974 (S.D. 
Fla. Apr. 9, 2013). 
 191. Cf. Sonia Goltz, Women’s Appeals for Equity at American Universities, 58(6) HUM. REL. 763, 784 (2005) 
(discussing the experiences of two complainants whose universities’ affirmative action officers were initially 
strongly supportive of their complaints, but then made an abrupt about-face and became much less supportive). 
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Grey-Allen’s in Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises,192 an employee undertaking a reason-
able investigation into allegations of discrimination should be protected from retaliation 
that cuts off the investigation before the facts can be ascertained. 
Of course, a legal standard purporting to measure the reasonableness of employee 
opposition is no panacea. The existing reasonable belief standard, which courts apply to 
retaliation claims brought under Title VII’s opposition clause, is emblematic of the dan-
gers. Courts currently apply the reasonable belief standard—to all employees alleging re-
taliation for their involvement in internal complaints, not just EEO employees—in a way 
that sets reasonableness far beyond the sights of the typical employee. Courts applying the 
reasonable belief doctrine measure reasonableness strictly, benchmarked against the sub-
stantive law of discrimination as interpreted by the courts. The standard advocated here 
for retaliation cases brought by EEO employees would take a very different tact in gauging 
the reasonableness of employee opposition, measuring it not by the external law but from 
the perspective of a reasonable EEO employee operating under the employer’s anti-dis-
crimination policies. The critical move in the standard advocated here is to measure rea-
sonableness from the perspective of persons with the employee’s job responsibilities and 
operating under the employer’s anti-discrimination policies. Under this version of a rea-
sonableness standard, employers would still have a role in supervising the job performance 
of EEO employees, and could take action against those who unreasonably construe dis-
crimination requirements and/or respond unreasonably to discrimination complaints, as 
measured against professional norms. While the shift to such a reasonableness standard is 
far from ideal, and is accompanied by the risk of courts following their own norms rather 
than those of the EEO profession, the dilemmas created by the overlay of retaliation law 
onto a legal regime that incentivizes and defers to internal compliance while leaving intact 
employer autonomy over job performance defy an easy resolution through doctrinal rules. 
The approach advocated here would at least bring greater harmony between retaliation and 
discrimination law, in-keeping with the Court’s prior recognition that the two cannot be 
productively separated. 
The current void in retaliation coverage for EEO employees undermines whatever 
benefits internal governance has to offer.193 Instead of incentivizing employers to act as 
voluntary agents of change in furthering the anti-discrimination project, the lack of pro-
tection for the employees doing this work makes these processes mere window dressing.194 
By granting free rein to employers to fire or otherwise penalize EEO employees for taking 
seriously discrimination complaints, retaliation law adds fuel to the fire of the critics who 
denounce employer self-monitoring.195 The doctrinal gap exposed here also undermines 
                                                          
 192. Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9441 (2d Cir. May 9, 2012); see supra text ac-
companying notes 58–64. 
 193. For a defense of an internal governance model that incentivizes voluntary employer policies and processes 
addressing discrimination, see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Ap-
proach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). 
 194. Cf. Bennington, supra note 39, at 16, 18–19 (discussing the conflicts facing HR managers that inhibit 
them from standing up to discrimination, and discussing study findings suggesting that HR managers in fact do 
no better than line managers in implementing nondiscriminatory selection systems). 
 195. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance 
in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2003); Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 
4; Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers, supra note 6. 
40
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss1/1
2014] RETALIATION IN THE EEO OFFICE 41 
one of the strengths of retaliation law: properly applied, it creates space for building coa-
litions within the workplace whereby employees work together to fulfill the goal of equal 
opportunity. But without protection from retaliation, the employees overseeing internal 
anti-discrimination policies would be better off keeping their noses to the ground and look-
ing out for themselves. Instead of facilitating EEO employees in protecting the rights of 
their fellow workers, the gaps in the law set up the incentive to be a “company man” and 
convey whatever message the employer wants to hear. 
CONCLUSION 
In his classic work, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, A.O. Hirschman extolled voice as a 
productive force in response to organizational decline and stagnation.196 He argued that 
loyalty mediates between exit and voice, and that greater loyalty makes people more likely 
to voice their dissent rather than exit the organization. Subsequent literature has expounded 
on the benefits of voice—to the organization and to society—and on the desirability of 
incentivizing voice over exit.197 Perversely, retaliation doctrine now privileges exit over 
voice—first, by reserving the highest level of protection for complaints made to external 
authorities (courts and the EEOC), and second, by removing the personnel who oversee 
internal complaint channels from even the lower level of protection in the law. The effect 
is to stifle not only the voice of the employees who oversee EEO compliance, but also the 
employees who use these channels to bring their own internal discrimination com-
plaints.198 Maintaining the integrity of internal complaint channels is essential if employees 
are to have the fortitude it takes to use them. Denying protection from retaliation to the 
employees who oversee EEO compliance hurts both those employees and any others who 
might use these processes to voice their concerns about discrimination. 
Rather than helping to stabilize and fulfill the mission of discrimination law, retali-
ation doctrine is now developing in a way that works against that mission. The doctrinal 
gaps discussed in this article expose a foundational crack in the edifice. Despite the flow-
ery rhetoric in many of the Court’s recent retaliation cases, retaliation law is out of synch 
with the promise of discrimination law. 
                                                          
 196. A.O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND STATES (1970). 
 197. See generally VOICE AND WHISTLEBLOWING IN ORGANIZATIONS: OVERCOMING FEAR, FOSTERING 
COURAGE AND UNLEASHING CANDOR (Ronald J. Burke & Cary L. Cooper, eds. 2013). 
 198. Cf. Chambliss, supra note 16, at 53 (noting that “most employees who complain about discrimination do 
so through internal workplace procedures, where they are represented by internal EEO personnel”). 
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